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Abstract 
Essays on Using Climate Information in Disaster and Climate Risk Management 
Denyse S. Dookie 
 
Within the growing concern about the short-term and lasting impacts of natural hazard-
based disasters on lives, livelihoods and economies, the ability to manage disaster and climate risk 
is central to sustainable development. As many recent disasters are directly or indirectly related to 
weather or climate, and with the expectation that climate variability and change may exacerbate 
the frequency and/or intensity of related hazards and extreme weather events, climate information 
has become a critical component of disaster and climate risk management. However, despite its 
increasing use, as well as money, time and effort into gathering and processing the relevant data, 
few studies highlight the connection between climate information and development outcomes. 
Using a Caribbean lens, this dissertation explores how the awareness, provision and use of 
weather and climate information, including storm advisories/forecasts and satellite-based rainfall 
data, may be linked to development outcomes, both in terms of localized impacts of weather- and 
climate-related events but also within the wider macro-economy. I explore if development 
outcomes may vary by event day-of-week timing (hypothesizing a relation to possible differences 
in climate information provision), study whether there may be a human element of improving 
climate information, and analyze climate information details to best understand its potential use in 
Caribbean small states. Such research aligns well with ongoing efforts to understand and predict 
extreme events, as well as connect disasters to socio-economic outcomes, and can also enrich 
perspectives which concern assessing vulnerability to disasters and recommending solutions to 
improve risk communication and strengthen disaster preparedness and resilience. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Climate information is a critical component of disaster risk reduction and climate risk 
management in many countries. Singh et al. (2018) describe scientific weather and climate 
information as “processed data, products and/or evidence-based knowledge about the atmosphere-
ocean system across short (hours to days) and long (seasons to decades) time scales” and highlight 
that the notion of information vis-à-vis data “implies that it has meaning and relevance within a 
given context”. As such, climate information can be used to assist agencies and governments with 
key data in informing short-, medium- and long-term decisions relating to priority topics within 
their respective regions. As economic and scientific research, as well as policy efforts, include or 
are designed to utilize climate information, it is important to ask: is the use of climate information 
effective for these purposes? Do we know if, and how, climate information can or should be used, 
as well as if there are factors which encourage or hinder its utility? Despite its increasing use, there 
are few studies which focus on the role and likely benefits of climate information for development 
outcomes. To offer some understanding, I explore this in a series of three essays. 
In the first paper, I consider the fact that disasters occur when natural hazards interact with 
people – disaster experts commonly say that there are no “natural” disasters (e.g. UN & World 
Bank, 2010). A natural hazard happens ‘randomly’, and on its own should generally have the same 
effect no matter the time or day it occurred. Given this nature of hazards, and considering that I 
care about the vulnerability and preparedness of people, would there be a difference of effect of 
disasters if I consider impact by day of week? To look at this, I consider a natural experiment 
analyzing the day-of-week timing of heavy rainfall events (>100 mm per day) and rainfall-related 
disaster outcomes, as well as macroeconomic variables, for 15 Caribbean countries over 1990-
2010, using a fixed effects model. I find, robustly, that the occurrence of heavy rainfall on Mondays 
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leads to approximately 8.5% more of the population affected, compared to non-Monday heavy 
rainfall. I also find that there are some macroeconomic consequences in some specifications. Such 
findings highlight that there may be some human aspect related to disaster risk, perhaps due to 
challenges of preparedness preceding impact, or the particular vulnerability of people on certain 
days of the week. This could have implications on how we understand, communicate and use 
climate information in the context of disaster preparedness, reducing vulnerability and 
strengthening resilience.  
My second paper focuses on a critical factor that may affect effective climate information, 
such as good or consistent storm forecasts. Since I am aware that weather forecasting requires 
active human insight, perhaps even 75% technology and 25% human involvement (UCL, 2018), 
is there a potential role of personal characteristics in making good forecasts? To look at this, I test 
the effect of forecasters on making a consistent storm advisory by exploring a unique dataset of 
US National Hurricane Center (NHC)-issued storm advisories for 14 Caribbean islands from 1998-
2015. My findings show that, despite having access to the same forecasting models and data, some 
forecasters may produce consistent forecasts more than others. As well when I focus on forecaster 
experience in predicting consistent advisory outcomes, I find that while those with more 
experience may make less low-level errors, they may also make more high-level errors, such as 
advising for a storm which eventually makes landfall as a major hurricane. While advisory 
consistency should be contextualized noting the dynamic nature and sometimes rapid 
intensification of storms, such research may be indicative of the important human element in 
assimilating and utilizing climate information, as well as communicating risk, and may be 
potentially helpful for further economic identification.  
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The third paper analyzes a dataset of storm lead times, or the time interval between the first 
storm advisory and storm approach, for 14 Caribbean countries over 1995-2015. Do we understand 
the varying nature of storm lead times across the Caribbean islands? Do we know if more severe 
storm advisories are associated with longer lead times? Further to this, would longer lead times 
have a positive effect on disaster impacts? To do this, I dissect and try to better explore climate 
information such as storm advisory and storm impact data to compile data on storm lead times. I 
first identify the differences in lead times by country, and use simple linear regression to 
understand relationships between storm lead times, forecast advisory types, storm intensity, and 
storm impacts. While stronger storms seem to have a generally longer lead time, the relation 
between lead times and impacts is not yet clear possibly due to confounding implications of 
stronger storms and increased impacts. Understanding such research structures could be helpful in 
minimizing problems related to causation in economic analyses, as well as highlighting avenues 
to improve risk communication and resilience-building within the region. 
These essays offer model-based assessable evidence to understand the likely pivotal role 
of climate information in the context of disaster resilience and sustainable development. The series 
uses novel ways of exploring how the awareness, provision and use of climate information – 
including satellite-based rainfall data and storm advisories/forecasts – could be connected to 
development outcomes, both in terms of localized impacts of weather- and climate-related events, 
but also within the wider macro-economy. While this research uses Caribbean data and context for 
analysis, the findings and likely lessons could be applicable in many other small island developing 
country settings, and the wider development context in general. Such research aligns well with 
ongoing efforts to deepen the understanding and prediction of extreme events and disasters, and 
studies which aim to understand the signal of climate change and variability, as well as disasters, 
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on the macroeconomy, and can also enrich perspectives which concern assessing vulnerability to 
disasters and recommending solutions to improve risk communication and strengthen disaster 
preparedness and resilience. 
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Chapter 2. Rainy Days on Mondays Always Get Me Down: 
Analyzing Disaster, Storm and Rainfall Data in the 
Caribbean, 1990-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
6 
Abstract 
 
While natural hazards have historically affected islands of the Caribbean, often with 
disastrous consequences, and there has been a general emphasis on the lasting impacts of disasters 
as well as building back better, there are few studies which focus on the likely human aspect of 
disaster impacts. Do we play a role in our disaster outcomes? Given the exogenous nature of 
natural hazards, and that a core element of concern is the vulnerability and preparedness of people 
in the context of natural hazard-based disasters, I question if there may be a difference of effect of 
disasters if I consider impact by day of week. To test this, I look at the annual proportion of 
population harmed by storms, focusing on the occurrence of heavy rainfall events on different days 
of the week. My initial assumption is that if human actions do play a role in disaster outcomes, in 
the sense that there is perhaps less preparedness on the weekend through reduced active awareness 
and communication by both local authorities and the general public compared to during the work-
week, then storms should have worse effects if they hit at the beginning of the week. Secondly, I 
consider the effect of preparedness in the macroeconomic context, by checking whether people 
affected by storms have consequences on national outcomes, and whether heavy rainfall events, 
specifically, are related to changes in economic output. 
I find that there is evidence suggesting a likely human aspect of disaster outcomes. 
Analyzing panel data using fixed effects for 15 Caribbean countries over the period 1990-2010, I 
observe that heavy rainfall events on Mondays robustly affect more people compared to events on 
any other day of the week. This could be due to challenges of preparedness preceding impact, or 
perhaps the particular vulnerability of people on Mondays. For instance, taking into account a 
typical 21-39 hour lead time between a storm forecast and storm approach, lower weekend 
government capacity and public awareness could possibly inhibit effective preparation, knowledge 
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assimilation, coordination, communication and response ahead of storms on Mondays. In addition, 
I find that there could be broader macroeconomic consequences. In some models, people hurt by 
storms may have negative effects on annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the findings show 
a significant negative relationship between heavy rainfall and GDP growth, with heavy rainfall on 
Mondays having increased impacts on annual GDP in some specifications. Such insights could 
have implications on how we understand, communicate and use climate information in the context 
of disaster preparedness, reducing vulnerability and strengthening resilience. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Natural hazard-based disasters are a major threat to lives, livelihoods, and economies. The 
EM-DAT database1 records 13,782 worldwide ‘natural’2 disasters3 over the period 1900-2015, 
resulting in at least 32.5 million deaths, injuring or otherwise affecting approximately 7.3 billion 
people, and contributing to estimated damages of US$2.8 trillion (EM-DAT, 2016). Small island 
states, such as those in the Caribbean, are especially vulnerable to the resulting effects of natural 
hazards (Rasmussen, 2004; Heger et al., 2008) since country size is likely to be a typical driver 
affecting the extent of disaster impact (Cavallo, Powell and Becerra, 2010), For these countries, 
socio-economic research underscoring the local context and challenges of natural hazard-based 
disasters is essential to identify the core factors and impending impacts of disasters, offer required 
policy direction, as well as justify the need for additional planning resources.  
Noy (2009) confirms that natural hazard-based disaster research has mostly focused on 
hazard prediction (largely undertaken by natural scientists), and that, further, “[a]lmost all the 
current research on the topic focuses on disasters ex ante”. Prior research efforts in this vein usually 
addressed how societies should prepare for disasters and minimize the costs of impacts. Examining 
a research gap at the time, his paper on the macroeconomic consequences of disasters was 
formative in the now-building literature on ex post impacts of disasters on economies, through an 
estimation of costs of disasters in terms of foregone production. To date, research in this topic has 
expanded to offer details on various disaster drivers and macroeconomic implications, as well as 
                                                                
1 CRED International Disaster Database, managed by the Université Catholique de Louvain in Brussels, Belgium 
2 EM-DAT defines a ‘natural’ disaster as the following: climatological (e.g. drought, wildfire), geophysical (earthquake, mass 
movements, volcanic activity), hydrological (flood, landslide), meteorological (extreme temperature, storm), biological 
(epidemic, insect infestation, animal epidemic), or extra-terrestrial (impact, space weather). 
3 EM-DAT includes all disasters from 1900 until present, which fit at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people dead; 
100 or more people affected; declaration of a state of emergency; call for international assistance.  
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an awareness of the effects of disasters in various dimensions, including countries’ labor markets, 
production efficiency, human capital base, gender, and fertility consequences.  
Despite the significant advances in the literature, and ongoing research on the cost-benefit 
analysis of disaster risk reduction and preparedness strategies (e.g., Shreve and Kelman, 2014), 
there seems to be few recent studies offering insights into the human aspect of disaster impacts, 
and specifically the role of human actions such as preparedness, i.e. active awareness, 
communication of climate information, and response capacity, in minimizing disaster risk and 
impact. Do we play a role in our disaster outcomes? Expert advice suggests that it does: focused 
discussions with an audience including disaster managers, meteorologists, and agriculture, tourism 
and health sector representatives at the May 2016 Caribbean Regional Wet/Hurricane Season 
Climate Outlook Forum in Roseau, Dominica, highlighted the importance of preparedness and 
disaster planning (Dookie, 2016). At least 72% of this professional group thought that there was a 
specific concern of the weekend affecting preparedness activities, likely due to relatively weaker 
capacity within public authorities and limited communication and awareness by the general public 
over weekends.  
A review of 24 major storm events within the Caribbean region over the period 1998-2008 
(as outlined in UNECLAC Damage and Loss Assessments) reveals an average 21-39 hour lead 
time between storm advisory/forecast and storm approach (see Figure 2-1). In general, such short 
advisory lead times suggest that ongoing adequate preparedness for storms and heavy rainfall 
events could be critical for minimizing the extent of disaster impacts. Additionally, disaster 
outcomes could perhaps be further limited if additional concern was offered to the likely weekend 
effect of weakened preparedness through capacity and information interruptions. 
 
10 
Figure 2-1: Lead Time of Storm Advisories (in hours), based on major storms of 1998-2008 
 
 
This figure is a compilation of data of 24 major storm events which affected one of the selected Caribbean countries 
over the period 1998-2008. The selection of the storm events was based on the availability of affected population and 
economic damages as estimated by UNECLAC Damage and Loss Assessments and tabulated within Zapata & 
Madrigal (2009). The vertical axis indicates the acronym of the affected country, storm intensity at time of impact, 
name of storm, and year. The listed country acronyms are: BHS (The Bahamas), BLZ (Belize), CYM (Cayman 
Islands), DMA (Dominica), DOM (Dominican Republic), GRD (Grenada), HTI (Haiti), JAM (Jamaica), LCA (Saint 
Lucia), and TCA (Turks and Caicos Islands). The length of the bars refer to the “lead time” of each storm event, i.e. 
the difference in time (in hours) between the first storm advisory and the impact of the storm on the corresponding 
country. The colors represent the type of first advisory that was issued for the particular storm for the particular 
country. 
 
 
With this background, I utilize a wide-ranging panel dataset of macroeconomic, disaster, 
storm, and daily rainfall variables for 15 Caribbean countries over the period of 1990-2010 to study 
two main questions. Firstly, I am interested in whether there are more or less people affected by 
storms on different days of the week. If people are more impacted on certain days of the week, this 
could offer insights on the human aspect of disaster impacts. For instance, if there is less capacity 
Average Difference in Time between 
Storm Advisory and Storm Approach 
(Lead Times): 
 
Tropical Storm Watch:  33 hours 
Tropical Storm Warning:  21 hours 
Hurricane Watch:   39 hours 
Hurricane Warning:   27 hours 
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for agency coordination and public awareness on the weekend, i.e. if preparedness is lower on 
weekend days, as suggested, then storms and heavy rainfall events should have worse effects in 
terms of more people affected if they hit at the beginning of the week. As such, this may be 
connected to preparedness having value. As well, there may be other human factors related to the 
vulnerability of people on certain days of the week. Secondly, I consider whether people affected 
by storms, and, more directly, heavy rainfall events themselves, may have any macro-economic 
consequences. This would allow me to understand whether such human factors have wider-ranging 
effects within the countries concerned. The use of day-of-week rainfall offers a natural experiment 
structure as a plausible inferential tool to study these questions.  
My research proposes a novel perspective of the human aspect of natural hazard-based 
disasters, specifically storms, and how this may affect countries, highlighting the notion of 
preparedness as a likely necessary factor in minimizing disaster risk. The paper begins with a 
review of the research on the topic, including inter-disciplinary work on disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness. Subsequent sections detail the data and methods used, as well as main findings of 
the study. Lastly, a section on concluding thoughts offers policy suggestions as well as further 
research objectives in this area. 
2.2 Background  
2.2.1. Research on Natural Hazard-based Disasters 
 
The understanding and prediction of hazardous events has been considerably advanced 
within the realm of natural science (Cavallo and Noy, 2010). Benefiting both commercial interests 
and general civil protection, innovative prediction models utilizing technologies such as improved 
radar (Creutin and Borga, 2003), satellite imagery (Joyce et al., 2009) and Geographical 
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Information Systems (Carrara et al., 1999) have vastly encouraged the monitoring and detection 
of, as well as response to, natural hazards.  
Economic research, on the other hand, has offered a better understanding of the 
fundamentals of disaster impacts on the community and economy. A focus on the typical drivers 
and conditions affecting country-level disaster impact has shown that the level of economic 
development matters (Cavallo and Noy, 2010). Kahn (2005) explains that even though developed 
countries experienced disasters of similar frequency and severity, there were less disaster-related 
deaths in these countries. Country size also plays a role (Cavallo, Powell and Becerra, 2010), with 
small island developing states described as particularly vulnerable to disaster impacts (Rasmussen, 
2004; Heger et al., 2008; Raddatz, 2009). Disaster impact may also be lower in situations of stable 
political systems or improved institutional conditions (Kahn, 2005; Toya and Skidmore, 2007; 
Raschky, 2008; Strömberg, 2007; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2013). Toya and Skidmore (2007) 
summarise that “countries with higher income, higher educational attainment, greater openness, 
more complete financial systems and smaller government experience fewer losses”.  
Within this growing area of research, there are yet varying perspectives on the short and 
long run consequences of disaster impacts on economies. In one of the earliest papers on the topic, 
Albala-Bertrand (1993) indicated that while disasters are a problem of development, “they are not 
necessarily a problem for development”. Utilizing a before-and-after statistical analysis, he 
showcases that macroeconomic outcomes did not get worse following a disastrous event, and that 
disaster impacts may be felt more by countries with weaker economic and political bases. Toya 
and Skidmore (2007) note that “as economies develop there are fewer disaster-related deaths and 
damages/GDP”. Other studies, however, suggest that natural hazard-based disasters do play a role 
in observable adverse macroeconomic impacts, which may lead to negative long-term growth and 
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development consequences (Hochrainer, 2009; von Peter et al., 2012; Hsiang and Jina, 2014), 
often especially within developing/low-income countries (Benson and Clay, 2004; Noy, 2009; 
Raddatz, 2009; Zapata and Madrigal, 2009; Strobl, 2012; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2013). In a 
study to show that the relationship between wealth and economic losses from disasters is mainly 
driven by the exposure to natural hazards, Schumacher and Strobl (2011) note that “extreme care 
must be taken when modelling and analyzing the relationship between wealth and economic 
development … [as] there appears to be no simple ‘increasing wealth–reducing losses’ 
relationship”.  
In a meta-analysis of studies which examine the relationship between per capita economic 
growth and natural hazard-based disasters, Klomp and Valckx (2014) conclude that there indeed 
exists a genuine negative effect, with the most significant adverse impacts coming from climatic 
disasters hindering growth in developing countries. The study notes, however, “some evidence 
that a part of the negative impact of natural disasters found in these studies is caused by a 
publication bias.” Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk (2014) also undertake a meta-analysis, finding 
similarly that, on average, disasters have a negative impact in terms of direct costs and an 
insignificant impact in terms of indirect costs. They also note that publication bias and time-based 
characteristics of the data strongly impact on the results of the primary studies, and suggest that 
more accurate results could be obtained in future studies by exploring the mitigation role of 
education, investment and openness (in direct cost studies). Given the expectation of climate 
change, population movements, and increased global production and consumption, which may all 
increase the negative impact of natural hazard-based disasters, such improved knowledge of effects 
could thus “provide evidence-based advice on policies that can reduce humanitarian problems.” 
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In addition to general impacts on economies and economic growth, socio-economic 
research has also outlined the effects of disasters in more specific dimensions. The gendered nature 
of catastrophes is evident in work by Neumayer and Plümper (2007): in a study of 141 countries 
over the period 1981 to 2002, it is shown that natural hazard-based disasters and their impacts kill 
more women on average, effectively narrowing the gender gap in life expectancy. Mueller and 
Osgood (2009) showcase the long-term effects of climate shocks, in this case drought, on rural 
wage losses in Brazil. Within the Atlantic and Gulfcoast counties of the USA, storm advisories 
seem to have an interesting relationship with fertility rates. As described by Evans et al. (2010), 
“low-severity storm advisories are associated with a positive and significant fertility effect and … 
high-severity advisories have a significant negative fertility effect.” Disasters are also said to bring 
detrimental and long-lasting effects to human capital (Baez et al., 2010), producing adverse 
consequences on nutrition, education, health and many income-generating processes.  
Yamamura (2014) reveals that while large disasters increase public sector corruption in 
both developed and developing countries, in developing countries such disasters have a greater 
effect, and further, the frequency of disasters has a significant impact on the level of corruption. 
The effect of natural and man-made disasters is tested on countries’ production efficiency by 
Halkos et al. (2015), finding that there is a positive relationship for lower number of disaster 
events, but negative after a specific threshold value. Kim & Marcouiller (2015) specifically study 
the effects of hurricane damage on tourism-based economies which include US national parks or 
seashores (situated on the Gulf of Mexico or Atlantic Ocean coastline). They found that disaster 
damage had a negative effect on these local economies, and regions with “stronger economies 
prior to natural disasters have lower disaster losses than regions with weaker economic 
characteristics”. 
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The above research offers a wide-ranging scope of knowledge on the prediction process, 
conditions and drivers, short and long-term macroeconomic impacts, and a range of direct and 
indirect socio-economic costs and risks associated with disasters. However, the specific review of 
whether disasters may affect people differently due to human influence, such as perhaps through 
sharing climate information and overall disaster preparedness, remains relatively underexplored. 
2.2.2. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Preparedness in Context 
 
Development agencies, including the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNISDR) and the World Bank, and a wide range of inter-disciplinary writing, have long 
suggested the need to minimize disaster impacts through an attention to risk, resilience, and 
adaptive capacity (Mochizuki et al., 2014) in order to maintain and sustain livelihoods, economic 
development and growth (Otero and Marti, 1995; Thomalla et al., 2006; MacBean, 2012; Vorhies, 
2013; World Bank, 2013; UNISDR, 2015c). Disasters pose a hindrance to poverty reduction and 
sustainable development (Pelling et al., 2002; Desai et al., 2015; Tanner et al., 2015), and the 
notion of disaster risk reduction (DRR) seems critical in assisting a global prosperity agenda. 
As a leading authority on the topic, the UNISDR defines disaster risk as a function of 
hazard, exposure and vulnerability, and expresses it as the probability of loss of life, injury or 
destroyed or damaged capital stock in a given period of time (Desai et al., 2015). Examples of 
DRR can include “reducing exposure to hazards, lessening vulnerability of people and property, 
wise management of land and the environment, and improving preparedness and early warning for 
adverse events” (UNISDR, n.d.). The post-2015 development agenda/2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development specifically notes DRR as an important development objective due to 
the inextricable link between DRR and achieving sustainable development (Hillier and 
Nightingale, 2013; IRDR and ICSU, 2014; UNISDR, 2015a-c; UN, n.d.). Of the 17 
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internationally-agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 global targets, 10 goals 
and 25 targets are related to DRR (UNISDR, 2015a), showcasing the cross-section of aspects and 
sectors through which disasters affect development. 
Despite this importance, DRR advancement faces several challenges, from problems 
measuring the costs and benefits as well as investing in DRR (IDB, IMF, OAS and the World 
Bank, 2005; Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010; CSIS, 2012; Vorhies, 2012; Shreve and Kelman, 
2014), to relatively limited funding channelled towards disaster prevention and preparedness, as 
noted in donors’ bilateral humanitarian assistance funds (Sparks, 2012; Kellett and Caravani, 2013; 
GHA, 2013 and 2015). Figure 2-2 (in the Appendix) shows that over 2004-2015, the majority of 
humanitarian assistance from the 26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries had been channeled towards 
material relief and assistance (including expenditures on shelter; water, sanitation and health 
services; supply of medicines and other non-food relief items; and assistance to refugees and 
internally displaced people in developing countries other than for food or protection4), and 
emergency food aid. Only an average of 3.6% of this funding was directed to disaster prevention 
and preparedness. 
In a United Nations and World Bank (2010) report entitled ‘Natural Hazards, UnNatural 
Disasters’ (highlighting that while hazards are natural, the “unnatural disasters [emphasis 
retained] are deaths and damages that result from human acts of omission and commission”), the 
focus on prevention is encouraged: the “effectiveness of prevention spending is more important 
than its magnitude”. It notes although prevention spending is less than post-disaster relief, it does 
                                                                
4 GHA (2013). 
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not imply that there is too little of it but rather that “disasters increase spending on relief and that 
such expenditures remain high for several subsequent years”. 
Research efforts to showcase and improve the visibility of the specific role of disaster risk 
reduction, and, in particular, the likely potential of preparedness strategies, has been notably absent 
in the literature. He and Zhuang (2016) understand that “[d]isaster loss is determined not only by 
post-disaster relief but also the pre-disaster mitigation and preparedness” and reveal a potential 
optimal policy-seeking model to balance both funding streams. Chan et al. (2012) undertook a 
cross-sectional, household survey in remote villages in China to examine if previous disaster 
experience significantly increased household disaster preparedness levels. Such a study found that 
although there was a significant association between previous disaster exposure and the perception 
of living in a high disaster risk area, elements of disaster preparedness were yet minimal. 
Noting the importance of preparedness, I test if people are more impacted by disaster events 
on certain days of the week, as this could be consistent with preparedness having value, or the role 
of other human factors affecting vulnerability. Such a research outcome could offer perspective to 
the wider understanding of the complexity of disaster impact channels and consequences, assisting 
both donors and affected countries to better align adequate anticipatory funding assistance to 
reduce impacts.    
2.2.3. Disasters in the Caribbean 
 
The small island states of the Caribbean are prone to natural hazards and resulting disasters. 
Reported EM-DAT data (see Table 2-3 in the Appendix) shows that there have been 549 natural 
hazard-based disasters in the region since record-keeping in 1900 to end-2015 (EM-DAT, 2016). 
Of these, 84.3% have been disasters relating to hydrological and meteorological disasters, 
 
18 
including floods, landslides and storms. The Caribbean’s islands and coastal regions have 
experienced at least 1,538 named storms, including 318 major hurricanes of categories 3, 4, and 5 
on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Intensity Scale.5 These storms collectively resulted in at least 
30,741 deaths, 22.3 million injured, missing and affected persons, and at least US$35.1 billion in 
total damages. For a region which recently had a population of 39 million, and an estimated 
combined GDP of US$332 billion, such impacts are certainly detrimental. Such impacts are also 
relatively understudied, especially within the socio-economic realm.  
Much like in the wider global lens, natural science researchers have long offered a scope 
for the Caribbean region on the better understanding of the nature and/or predictability of Atlantic 
storms (Walker et al., 1991; Tartaglione et al., 2003; Trenberth et al., 2006; Donnelly and 
Woodruff, 2007), observed changes in climate (Peterson et al., 2002; Karmalkar et al., 2013; 
Stephenson et al., 2014), as well as the likely projected climate based on downscaled regional 
climate models (Campbell et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2012; Karmalkar et al., 2013). 
Socio-economic research has only recently begun to focus on the impact of weather, 
climate and disasters within the region. In a seminal article regarding the region, Hsiang (2010) 
uses data for 28 Caribbean basin countries and finds that cyclones and temperature increases are 
associated with large reductions in economic output for industries not traditionally seen as 
vulnerable to climate change, such as within non-agricultural sectors. Specifically, he notes the 
adverse impacts of thermal stress on human labor.  
Strobl (2012) also looks at the particular impacts of hurricanes on macroeconomic 
outcomes in the wider Central American and Caribbean region. Using wind field models on 
                                                                
5 See: http://stormcarib.com/climatology/#links  
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hurricane track data to examine hurricane strikes, and controlling for country economic 
characteristics and time of the year of the storm strike, he finds that “average hurricane strike 
caused output to fall by at least 0.83 percentage points in the region”. His model is intended “to 
arrive at a more scientifically based index of potential local destruction … [which would allow for 
identification of] damages at a detailed geographical level, compare hurricanes' destructiveness, 
as well as identify the countries that are most affected, without having to rely on potentially 
questionable monetary loss estimates.” However, his paper notes that a wind-based index “may be 
neglecting the full impact of other damaging aspects of hurricanes, such as rainfall, and hence may 
be underestimating the true impact.” To amend this, the research thus included monthly levels of 
rainfall at a resolution of 0.5° from an Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
dataset, creating a hurricane rainfall index in the process. Even with this inclusion, it seemed that 
the wind speed index did a better job of capturing the negative effects of hurricanes. 
Bertinelli, Mohan, & Strobl (2016) state that there was “no comprehensive quantitative risk 
and anticipated loss assessment for the region”, and estimate expected risk and losses based on a 
similar prevailing climate of the past 30 years by using synthetic hurricane tracks and local income 
proxies. Their research finds that on average “the annual fraction of expected property damage and 
subsequent impacts on income are nonnegligible, with large variations across islands.” Moore et 
al. (2016) perform general equilibrium framework model simulations which suggest that not only 
do output losses due to hurricanes have economy-wide effects, but rural regions may suffer most. 
The work of the sub-regional headquarters for the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean has offered much insight into the impact and effects of natural hazard-
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based disasters within this small island grouping. Their Damage and Loss Assessments (DaLAs)6 
have been formidable in providing governments with contextual estimates of direct damage and 
indirect or foregone losses. Using data from these DaLAs in a before-and-after statistical analysis, 
Zapata & Madrigal (2009) reviewed extreme events within the region over the period 1990-2008, 
finding that “declines in real GDP and employment in some sectors following disasters temporarily 
set back living standards in affected countries”. Also including the impact of disasters on other 
macroeconomic elements such as external debt and the imports and exports of goods and services, 
it considers a serious challenge to be the increase of external debt in a disaster year compared to 
the year before.  
Kirton (2013) extensively reviews the scope and impact of natural hazard-based disasters 
on these small islands within the regional context of smallness, openness and vulnerability, to 
highlight the necessity of disaster risk management (DRM) by Caribbean governments. After 
reviewing existing and ongoing initiatives, challenges and successes regarding DRM, he offers a 
few suggestions to encourage such efforts, including: a standardization of institutional 
collaboration, a prioritization of DRM at the political level, an increase in disaster response 
capacity (due to the absence of a structural arrangement for mobilizing capacity in a timely 
fashion), strengthening community awareness and participation (as it was considered that 
“education and awareness programs are an important element in developing a culture of 
preparedness and safety in the region”), reduction in the duplication of efforts across Caribbean 
states, as well as the confirmation of DRM as a development priority. While Kirton (2013) offers 
a key insight into the need for improved DRM within the region, the particular role of disaster 
preparedness is not specifically studied within the region, similar to the global context. This 
                                                                
6 See: http://eclacpos.org/t/damage-and-loss-assessments  
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presents a notable research gap which could be of benefit to these islands which are frequently 
affected by storms and other disasters. 
The particular focus on the Caribbean should be of definite importance to countries 
including the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, due to the location of 
several of their island territories within the region, and the flow of development aid. The United 
States’ close proximity to the region and influence through storm surveillance and forecast 
information from the National Hurricane Center offers an incentive to minimize the risk and 
impacts of regional disasters. Uniquely, the study of the role of preparedness in Caribbean states 
can be influential for other small island regions, and the smaller size of these countries may create 
a valuable learning laboratory-type environment, suggesting evidence that could be scaled up for 
larger regions.  
2.3 Data 
 
One key strength of this paper is its utilization of various data sources. A wide-ranging 
dataset had to be compiled in order to best capture the potential of disaster preparedness efforts 
within the Caribbean region of interest. The research benefits from a combination of economic, 
disaster, storm track, storm advisory, as well as satellite rainfall data, as described below.  
To study the possible human aspect of storm-related disaster impacts, data was compiled 
for Caribbean countries affected by either tropical or convective storms within the region7 and for 
which there was readily available storm forecast advisories from the US National Hurricane 
Center8. The focus on the particular 15 Caribbean countries came from the interest in the effect of 
                                                                
7 Thus excluding Guyana and Suriname on the South American mainland. 
8 See: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/  
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disasters/role of preparedness in small island developing states9 within the region. The 15 
Caribbean countries studied in this paper include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos 
Islands10. 
2.3.1. Economic Data  
 
Zapata & Madrigal (2009) offers an assessment of extreme events within the Caribbean by 
comparing key macroeconomic variables in the year before and after a disaster to highlight the 
economic impact of the disaster on the country. The paper focuses on the annual gross domestic 
product, both current and at constant prices, expressed in aggregate as well as per capita terms, 
value of imports and exports of goods and services, and value of external debt. I also include these 
variables in this study, as sourced from the UNECLAC’s CEPALSTAT website11 alongside data 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database12. World Bank data includes 
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data available in current prices, for comparison and 
reference to the UNECLAC source data (there is a 99.9% correlation between this UNECLAC and 
World Bank GDP data variable), as well as gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) data, to 
underscore the importance of capital accumulation to local economic growth and development13. 
While economic data is generally available for the Caribbean islands, a full dataset was not 
possible due to data limitations for Haiti, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands.  
                                                                
9 Thus excluding Puerto Rico, due to its economic size and relationship with the United States.  
10 Other Caribbean countries, including Anguilla, Aruba, Cuba, and islands within the UK Territories, Netherlands Antilles, 
French West Indies, British and US Virgin Islands were not included mainly due to the availability of a wide range of data. 
11 See: http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i  
12 See: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators  
13 Kelley & Williamson (1973) 
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2.3.2. Disaster Data 
 
The EM-DAT database, or CRED International Disaster Database, is managed by the 
Université Catholique de Louvain in Brussels, Belgium, and details information for 22,076 
worldwide natural and technological14 over the period 1900 to July 2016. The database defines a 
disaster as a hazardous event which fits at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people 
dead; 100 or more people affected; declaration of a state of emergency; call for international 
assistance.  
Readily-available EM-DAT data was downloaded for the study’s 15 Caribbean countries 
based on the annual number of total deaths (i.e. sum of deaths and missing persons), total annual 
affected persons (i.e. sum of those injured15, homeless16 and affected17), and total annual economic 
damages (defined as the amount of damage to property, crops, and livestock, registered in event 
year values). EM-DAT’s disaster impact data was corroborated with the impact findings 
(especially total damages) of 28 damage and loss assessments done by UNECLAC, and it was 
found that there was a 94.4% correlation between these two estimated economic damage datasets. 
In total, for the defined 15 Caribbean countries, there were 261 natural and technological disasters 
within the research period of 1990-2010, of which there were 128 unique storm disaster events. 
Due to multiple storms in some countries and years, this resulted in a filtering of 91 instances of 
country-disaster observations.  
                                                                
14 Defined as either an industrial, transport or miscellaneous accident. 
15 Injured refers to people suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an illness requiring immediate medical assistance as a direct 
result of a disaster. 
16 Homeless refers to the number of people whose house is destroyed or heavily damaged and need shelter after an event. 
17 Affected refers to people requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e. requiring basic survival needs such 
as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance. 
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For reference, UN and World Bank (2010) reminds us that “earthquakes, droughts, floods, 
and storms are natural hazards, but the unnatural disasters are deaths and damages that result 
from human acts of omission and commission” [emphasis retained]. Each disaster is unique and it 
is important to better understand various inter-disciplinary processes which lead to and/or 
exacerbate the impacts of natural hazards. Also, it is noted that there may be other events which 
were considered a local ‘disaster’, but which did not meet the minimum recording thresholds based 
on the definition of a disaster by EM-DAT. Strobl (2012) offers a reminder that damage estimates 
from EM-DAT may come from different sources (which may have differences in the nature and 
quality of reporting), and that some costs “may be exaggerated to attract international emergency 
relief”. Although databases such as the Climate Impacts Database by the Caribbean Institute for 
Meteorology and Hydrology18 as well as DesInventar19 currently exist, comparable data for the 
selected countries within the region for this period is not yet available. 
2.3.3. Storm Track and Advisory Data 
 
I analyze storm track data to develop a simple proxy which will be based on satellite rainfall 
data (see section below), to broaden the dataset and address inconsistencies between storm tracks, 
storm advisories, and known storm damages. This review of available storm data was essential to 
first understand the various storm disaster impacts within the region. Over the period 1998-2008, 
UNECLAC damage and loss assessments (DaLAs) were requested for at least 23 storm disaster 
events (due to 14 storms) within the listed 15 Caribbean countries.  Countries request UNECLAC 
DaLAs when they need to best estimate disaster impacts ahead of local, regional and international 
                                                                
18 See: http://rcc.cimh.edu.bb/cid/  
19 See: https://online.desinventar.org/ 
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funding requests and appeals for international assistance, so I focused on these key events due to 
their signature of disaster severity. 
For each of these storms, I utilized information on the NOAA Office of Coastal 
Management website, Historical Hurricane Tracks20 (without using improved software or 
programming), collecting data on these particular storms’ track across the Caribbean Basin and 
specifically noting the date, time, and storm characteristics at the time of landfall or otherwise 
closest point of approach to any of the 15 countries in question. I also included country-level data 
on the number of storms and major storms (i.e. of Category 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale) 
within 100 and 200 nautical miles. This yielded a conservative number of storms, as estimation 
was done by eyeballing the various storms within the required distance from the coastline. 
Storm forecast/advisory data was also collected by way of manually scraping uploaded 
Tropical Cyclone Reports on the National Hurricane Center (NHC) website for each of the 14 
storms under main review. This process proved arduous to collate each of the beginnings and 
endings of each of the four tropical forecasts/advisories offered: tropical storm21 watches22 and 
warnings23, and hurricane24 watches and warnings. The collated advisory data was then tabulated 
against the storm track data to analyze the lead time between each storm forecast and storm landfall 
or closest point of approach, as shown in Figure 2-1.  
Storm forecast data, here, represent official watches and warnings from the NHC. Personal 
communication with Caribbean meteorological agencies reveal that there is a process of 
                                                                
20 See: https://www.coast.noaa.gov/hurricanes/ 
21 A tropical storm is a cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind speed (using the U.S. 1-minute average) ranges 
from 34 knots (39 mph or 63 km/hr) to 63 knots (73 mph or 118 km/hr). See: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/  
22 Watches indicate the possibility of an event within the specified area within 48 hours. 
23 Warnings indicate the expectation of an event within the specified area within 36 hours. 
24 A hurricane is a tropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind (using the U.S. 1-minute average) is 64 knots 
(74 mph or 119 km/hr) or more. 
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information transfer between the NHC and local government authorities and agencies, which may 
or may not be in the affected island, before such forecasts are made publicly available. This process 
may delay or have other consequences on the transfer and real-time availability of forecast 
information. 
2.3.4. Rainfall Data 
 
The analysis of the storm track data, above, highlighted the ambiguous nature of 
understanding storms and their respective impacts. Through my investigation, I found that the 
usual definition of storm landfall, i.e. when a storm crosses the coastline of a country, and other 
ways of characterizing storm impacts, revealed inconsistences and missed storm-related events 
which had notable effects on a country, based on a review and understanding of known storm 
damages from UNECLAC DaLAs and EM-DAT data. In one main example, NHC’s Tropical 
Advisory Report for Hurricane Michelle in October-November 2001 did not include storm 
advisory data for the island of Jamaica, and in reviewing the storm track, the closest point of 
approach of the storm was at least 550 kilometers southwest of Negril Point in the south-west of 
the island (as seen in Figure 2-3 , Appendix). However, Michelle produced a large area of disturbed 
weather across the western Caribbean (see Figure 2-4, Appendix), and UNECLAC (2001) details 
that 6 north-eastern parishes of Jamaica received violent rain over the period of October 27 to 
November 5 2001, collectively averaging 1924mm. The associated rainfall of Hurricane Michelle 
was assessed by local authorities and UNECLAC as the cause of massive impacts in Jamaica in 
the form of UNECLAC estimated damage and losses of upwards of US$53 million (or 0.8% of 
the country’s total GDP)25. 
                                                                
25 UNECLAC (2001) 
 
27 
In looking at rainfall patterns in Jamaica for this period, I noted that the impacts of 
Hurricane Michelle were clearly shown. As illustrated in the sequence of CHIRPS satellite 
precipitation estimates over Jamaica for the period of October 29 to November 5 2001, in Figure 
2-5 in the Appendix, heavy rainfall is notably confirmed across the north-eastern parishes of 
Jamaica. As such, in order to have the most inclusive dataset of storm events, I look at precipitation 
estimates by country as an effective proxy. To have the most conservative test of storm events by 
day of the week, I consider the basic understanding of a binary indicator of heavy rainfall events 
by day of the week, where heavy rainfall is defined as more than 100 mm of rainfall per day26.  
Such a simple proxy, though effective in indicating the occurrence of a heavy rainfall event by day 
of week, would be likely biased towards the null hypothesis of no significant difference between 
the specified populations. However, if significance were to be found, it could signal a relationship 
worthy of further development and investigation. 
To arrive at daily precipitation data I specifically used daily satellite rainfall estimates 
because of the spatially sparse rain gauge data within the Caribbean region (Dookie, 2015). While 
there is a range of rainfall estimation-relevant satellite products that exist at the three-hourly and 
daily timescales for the region, only the pentad CHIRPS product allowed for the finest spatial 
resolution at 0.05° (Dookie, 2015). CHIRPS, which refers to Climate Hazards Group InfraRed 
Precipitation with Station data, is a secondary data product of the University of California-Santa 
Barbara Climate Hazards group that was developed for use in Seasonal Drought monitoring and 
Trend Analysis. It blends the CHIRP data, i.e. InfraRed long-term average precipitation estimates, 
                                                                
26 Meteorologists classify rain intensity according to the rate of fall, with heavy rainfall defined as “over 0.76 cm (0.30 in.) per 
hour or more than 0.076 cm (0.03 in.) in six minutes” (Glickman, 2000). WMO defines heavy rain as more than 50 mm of 
rainfall in 24 hours (WMO), while New Zealand defines it as more than 100 mm in 24 hours (NIWA). In this tropical region, and 
since most countries received plentiful rainfall, a conservative estimate of 100 mm of rainfall per day was used as the heavy 
rainfall threshold.  
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with in-situ station data (Funk et al., 2015). The unbiased satellite precipitation grid values of 
CHIRP, in units of millimeters per pentad, are produced each month based on averaged satellite 
observations and physiographic parameters27. While daily CHIRPS estimates are available for 
Africa, daily estimates for the Caribbean region of interest have been temporally disaggregated 
from pentad estimates. 
Using CHIRPS, daily rainfall estimates were acquired by first applying political boundaries 
to each country and masking out everything else (i.e. grid boxes that didn’t at least intersect with 
the country boundary), then retaining the maximum value of all grid boxes in the selected spatial 
domain for each country along the selected daily time grid. In this way, only an indication of the 
maximum rainfall value per country per day was obtained as a proxy to best reflect the highest 
intensity of daily rainfall which could be related to disaster-related impacts.  
This data was also checked for any underlying trends which may affect the exogenous 
nature of the dataset (in the Appendix, see Figure 2-6 for a boxplot of the number of heavy rainfall 
events by day-of-week; Table 2-4 for heavy rainfall by country; Table 2-5 for heavy rainfall by 
day-of-week.) 
2.4 Research Design and Method 
 
One of the main questions of this research is centered on whether there may be a difference 
of disaster impacts by day of week. The general idea behind this question is to identify the possible 
human aspect of disaster impacts, perhaps through the role of disaster preparedness and its 
relationship to disaster outcomes. In this context, I consider the differences in the impact of heavy 
rainfall events on different days of the week on the proportion of people affected by storm 
                                                                
27 Web Source: http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2013AGUFM.H33E1417P  
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disasters. The intuition for such a model stems from the assumption that in a prepared society there 
should be no real difference between the effects of rainfall on different days of the week – severe 
events would have disastrous consequences regardless of the day-of-week timing. As expert advice 
suggests that there may be limitations in local public and agency communication and capacity over 
weekends, if there is indeed less preparedness on weekends compared to on weekdays, storms may 
have worse effects if they hit at the beginning of the week.  
By utilizing the indicator variable of heavy rainfall events on different days of the week to 
understand the human effect, the study is essentially a natural experiment through which observed 
rainfall is determined by nature and as such arguably resembles a random assignment across time. 
(A quick note: natural experiments are observational studies in which an event or a situation (such 
as policy changes, weather events, or natural disasters) that allows for the random or seemingly 
random assignment of study subjects to different groups is exploited to answer a particular 
question.) I do confirm that rainfall and heavy rainfall events are randomly distributed, when I 
check by country or day of the week. 
Of interest, the day-of-the-week timing approach has also been employed in other research, 
mostly within the medical field investigating the admission and mortality outcomes based on 
weekdays versus weekends (Kostis et al., 1997; Carr et al., 2011; Meisel and Pines, 2011). As 
Meisel and Pines (2011) describe in a Time Magazine article “Why You Don’t Want to Get Sick 
on a Saturday”, nights or weekends may see an experienced but skeletal staff compared to a regular 
Monday afternoon, for example, which could lead to differences in mortality outcomes. Similarly, 
the medical field has also studied the possible “July Effect” (Dasenbrock et al., 2012; Meisel and 
Pines, 2012; Weaver et al., 2012; DiBiase et al., 2014). It’s been suggested that the month of July 
sees staff in new positions (new interns and trainees, and beginnings of new promotions and 
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appointments), and such new experiences may or may not lead to more medical mistakes. It is 
noted that such research directly use the timing approach as a test of impacts on different days of 
the week or the months of the year, and not as a result of a natural experiment. 
Random occurrences have also be used to understand the perception of storms. Jung et al. 
(2014) suggest that there is an unfortunate consequence of the gendered naming of storms, as an 
analysis of 63 years of US death rates from 92 hurricanes show that “feminine-named hurricanes 
cause significantly more deaths than do masculine-named hurricanes”. The authors use results of 
multiple experiments to suggest that gender-based expectations about severity hinder hurricane 
communication and preparedness, as “feminine- vs. masculine-named hurricanes are perceived as 
less risky and thus motivate less preparedness”. 
 
To effectively understand if there is a human aspect of disaster impacts, I consider two 
main questions. I am firstly interested in whether there are more or less people affected by storms 
on different days of the week, by testing the occurrence of heavy rainfall events on each day of the 
week on the annual proportion of people affected by storms. I take this proportion based on the 
total population in the year of the event, as well as in the year prior. I expect that more people hurt 
by storms on early days of the work week may be related, for instance, to human influences such 
as the limited preparedness over weekends to assist countries ahead of storms and heavy rainfall 
events. 
Next, if the above results highlight a difference by day of week, which could possibly be 
consistent with preparedness having value or some other human factor related to vulnerability and 
risk, then it would be important to do additional research with unrelated outcomes to see if there 
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are similar relationships. One such unrelated outcome could be macroeconomic consequences. To 
understand this, I first test the effect of disaster-affected people on the macro-economy, as I expect 
that limited preparedness on weekends may lead to more hurt people, which may in turn negatively 
affect annual macroeconomic outcomes including a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), 
exports and imports of goods and services, as well as external debt. This is based on results in 
Zapata & Madrigal (2009), which reported that disasters in the Caribbean led to declines in 
macroeconomic indicators following a disaster event. As well, I directly test the effect of heavy 
rainfall events on different days of the week since I note that cyclone models have macroeconomic 
impacts (Hsiang, 2010; Strobl, 2012), and I expect that such macroeconomic impacts may also 
show up in the intermediate datasets, such as direct extreme weather observations, e.g. heavy 
rainfall events, and reports from the ground. If preparedness has value, then limited preparedness 
on weekends may also show that heavy rainfall events on early days of the work-week may have 
worse impacts on macroeconomic variables such as GDP. 
For both questions, I use regression analysis in the form of a fixed effects model to test this 
effect through a quasi-experiment, as I want to understand the differences in the impact of heavy 
rainfall events by day of week on different outcomes in a range of Caribbean countries. A fixed 
effects model generally allows controlling for the stable characteristics in any observable or 
unobservable predictors, likely minimizing large sources of bias, to hone in on the potential effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable. In this research, I consider country and year 
fixed effects in the regression analysis to control for the average differences across countries and 
time, to ensure a focus on the potential effect of heavy rainfall instances, as the main independent 
variable, on the dependent variable, which is either disaster outcomes (looking at people affected 
by storms) or macroeconomic outcomes (such as gross domestic product). In some specifications, 
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I include country fixed effects as well as a linear or quadratic time trend, to account for year-to-
year differences which may be different from averaging differences across time through year fixed 
effects. 
As mentioned before, in order to have the most conservative test, I consider the simplest 
proxy of storm hits by day of the week to see if it might significantly predict outcomes. The 
simplest indicator here is a dummy of whether or not there was a heavy rainfall event by day of 
the week in a particular year, in a particular country. The use of this binary variable for the rainfall 
measurement is the most basic approach to understanding the possible association of heavy rainfall 
events on the dependent outcome variable. Such a simple proxy, though effective in indicating the 
occurrence of a heavy rainfall event by day of week, would be likely biased towards the null 
hypothesis of no significant difference between the specified populations. However, if significance 
were to be found, it could signal a relationship worthy of further development and investigation. 
Through this research design, I build upon the existing economic research and address the 
various gaps in the literature base by testing whether there may be a human aspect of disaster 
impact, whether on people affected or on the macro-economy.  
2.5 Results 
2.5.1. Is there a difference of disaster impact by day of week? 
 
The main intention of this paper is to understand the likely human aspect of disaster 
impacts, perhaps through their vulnerability and preparedness, by asking the question if there may 
be a difference of disaster impacts by day of week. In this context, I used fixed effects linear 
regression models to consider the differences in the impact of heavy rainfall events on different 
days of the week on the proportion of people affected by storm disasters. If humans do play a role 
in disaster outcomes, and there is a differential role of information and preparedness depending on 
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when information is shared/used, then there may be more impacts based on disasters happening 
on some days over others. Otherwise, severe events would have disastrous consequences 
regardless of the day-of-week timing. As expert advice suggests that there may be limitations in 
local public and agency communication and capacity over weekends, if there is indeed less 
preparedness on weekends compared to on weekdays, storms may have worse effects if they hit at 
the beginning of the week. As such, I first consider whether the occurrence of heavy rainfall on 
the first day of the Caribbean work week – Monday – has any influence on the annual proportion 
of people affected by storm disasters.  
As shown in Table 2-1, the natural experiment robustly supports my primary hypothesis 
that there may indeed be some likely human aspect of disaster impacts – heavy rainfall events on 
Mondays seems to be associated with an increased proportion of people affected by storm 
disasters, when compared to non-Monday heavy rainfall events. This result holds under several 
specifications: in disaster years including country fixed effects and a quadratic time trend, as well 
as including both country and year fixed effects, the occurrence of heavy rainfall on Mondays 
leads to approximately 8.5% more of the population affected, compared to non-Monday heavy 
rainfall. As done in other studies (e.g. Strobl, 2012), this is also tested by using the storm affected 
numbers as a percentage of the previous year’s population (to account for year-to-year population 
disparities), and the result yet holds. As well, the positive effect of Monday heavy rain event 
occurrences also holds when considering not just countries which experienced disasters in some 
years, but the full 315 study observations (15 countries over 21 years), compared to non-Monday 
events.  
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Table 2-1: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis of Storm Disaster Affected 
Population, highlighting Monday Rainfall Dummy  
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Storm Disaster Affected People as % of Total Population 
Disaster Years All Years 
# Affected/Current 
Pop 
# Affected/Lagged 
Pop  
# Affected/Current 
Pop  
# Affected/Lagged 
Pop  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Monday 
Rainfall 
Dummy 
8.482** 8.576* 7.744** 7.519 1.807* 1.746 1.834* 1.770 
(3.680) (4.482) (3.592) (4.434) (0.862) (1.090) (0.872) (1.105) 
Year -102.3  -302.9  -43.51  -42.71  
 (250.2)  (324.5)  (85.97)  (87.32)  
yrSq 0.0256  0.0757  0.0109  0.0107  
 (0.0626)  (0.0812)  (0.0215)  (0.0218)  
Constant 101,905 -7.701 302,865 -4.396 43,377 -0.973 42,579 -1.062 
 (249,910) (4.683) (324,339) (4.917) (85,891) (1.007) (87,235) (1.047) 
         
Observations 91 91 84 84 315 315 315 315 
R-squared 0.085 0.206 0.074 0.190 0.026 0.086 0.026 0.086 
Number of 
Country 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Country FE y y y y y y y y 
Year FE  y  y  y  y 
 
This table shows the effect of the dummy variable for Heavy Rainfall on Mondays (Monday Rainfall Dummy) on the 
dependent variable, the proportion of persons affected by storm disasters for 15 Caribbean countries. The first two 
columns report the number of affected persons as a percentage of the total population in the disaster year, while the 
third and fourth columns report the number of affected persons as a percentage of the population in the year prior to 
the disaster. The first four columns report this information for only years in which a country experienced a storm 
disaster, while the last four columns report the results of the test for all 21 years of the research period (1990-2010). 
Odd-numbered columns show the results for a fixed effects model controlling only for country effects, although a 
quadratic time trend is included (i.e. Year and yrsq, the squared value of Year), while even-numbered columns show 
the results for both country and year fixed effects (FE). All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with 
significance levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
The event of heavy Monday rainfall is also a robust variable when considering its effect on 
storm disaster-affected people compared to other days of the week, as shown in Table 2-6, either 
when looking at country-disaster years or all years within the study. Heavy rainfall events on 
Monday seem to consistently have a worse effect on the annual proportion of people affected by 
storm disasters. 
To better understand the relationship between the daily heavy rainfall event dummy (the 
main independent variable), and the disaster outcome (the dependent variable), I also slightly alter 
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the main regression specification by changing the added control variables and the number of years 
considered within each regression (i.e. either considering all years, or years in which there was a 
noted disaster event for a particular country). As well, in some specifications rainfall dummies are 
included within the same regression, and in the other tables, the regressions are done separately. 
This is since there may be differences in terms of how the daily rainfall variables interact with 
each other when considered simultaneously compared to when the outcome is estimated based on 
one sole independent variable. This is all done as part of a diagnostic check, to get a better sense 
of the robustness of the relationship between the specified variables.  
As shown in Table 2-7, Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 within the Appendix, heavy rainfall events 
on Saturdays seems to negatively influence disaster-affected people. Such heavy rains on 
Saturdays lead to a 4.5-5.5% decline in the proportion of population affected by storms, although 
the Saturday effect only holds in disaster years. This insight complements the idea that there is 
some human aspect of disaster impacts, as the work-week usually offers valid agency capacity, 
and the local public would have had the support to receive vital communication and be actively 
aware of impending storm and rainfall threats.  
This latter finding is also echoed in models to understand the effects of heavy rainfall 
events on weekdays versus the weekends. Table 2-10, in the Appendix, shows that the occurrence 
of heavy rainfall events on weekends leads to a decline in the number of people affected by storm-
related disasters, under country and year-level fixed effects, when compared to non-weekend 
heavy rainfall events. As a measure to utilize a different understanding of heavy rainfall events, it 
is noted that this table also looks at both the number of days in a year with heavy rainfall as well 
as the binary indication of a heavy rainfall event by the day of the week. While the signs are 
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different between these two distinctions, statistical significance is only shown when looking at the 
simple binary indicator. 
The use of this binary indicator of heavy rainfall events and the significant findings that 
there may be an association of certain days of the week on disaster outcomes do raise concerns of 
whether there may be biases in the impacts dataset which may drive spurious findings. To further 
test and understand the role of the occurrence of heavy rainfall events by day of the week, I now 
look at unrelated datasets that may reflect disaster impacts to see if they may independently show 
similar relationships.  
2.5.2. Macroeconomic Consequences of Heavy Rainfall Events and Disaster-
Affected Persons 
 
Towards a deeper understanding of whether there may be some human aspect of disaster 
impacts, I also test the relationship between heavy rainfall events by day of the week, as well as 
storm-disaster affected persons, and macroeconomic consequences such as changes in national 
Gross Domestic Product, and the import and export of goods and services (as identified in Zapata 
& Madrigal (2009)). As independent and unrelated datasets, if there were statistically significant 
relationships found with these macroeconomic variables, then in addition to the findings in the 
previous section, this may offer some indication of a sound connection between heavy rainfall 
events by day of week and these outcomes. In this section, I show that in some model specifications 
there is some significant evidence of a link between heavy rainfall events on Mondays, as well as 
persons affected by storms, and GDP and other macroeconomic outcomes.  
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2.5.2.a. Effects on Gross Domestic Product 
 
In this section, I look at the results of fixed effects linear regression models testing the 
effects of heavy rainfall events by day of the week, as well as the proportion of storm disaster 
affected persons, on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP refers to the value of goods and services 
produced in a country during a year, and, generally, changes in GDP over time offer information 
on the macroeconomic health of the country. GDP data reported in “current” or “nominal” prices 
refer to the market value of these goods, i.e. the value in that particular year (in this paper I report 
all in US dollar equivalent, but generally the data is collected in local currency units).  Data in 
"constant" or "real" terms show the data for each year in the value of a particular base year. So, for 
example, data reported in constant 2010 prices would show data for 1990, 2000, 2015 and all other 
years in 2010 prices. Since current prices are influenced by the effect of price inflation, constant 
prices data are generally used to measure the true growth of a series, i.e. adjusting for the effects 
of price inflation. I use both series to see if there may be differences between the two, and would 
hope to see a relationship with the constant dollar values, as this adjusts for the effects of inflation. 
Also, I include both current and constant prices data from two different sources (World 
Bank and UNECLAC), as sometimes there are slight differences in agency calculations based on 
their definitions, data sources, use of data estimates and projections, and so on. As well, I consider 
the GDP based on the population in the year of calculation, indicated here as GDP per capita. The 
use of a variety of GDP sources here highlights the value and differences of each measure to better 
reflect and understand the relationship between rainfall, as well as people affected, on the 
macroeconomic outcome. In summary, 12 forms of GDP were tested for this research, as identified 
in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2: Summary of Forms of GDP 
Type of 
GDP 
Code Description & Source 
Current 
Dollar GDP 
GDPcEC Current dollar GDP estimates from UNECLAC source 
logGDPcEC Natural logarithm of above variable 
GDPcWB Current dollar GDP estimates from World Bank source 
logGDPcWB Natural logarithm of above variable 
GDPcpcEC Current dollar per capita GDP estimates from UNECLAC 
source 
logGDPcpcEC Natural logarithm of above variable 
GDPcpcWB Current dollar per capita GDP estimates from World Bank 
source 
logGDPcpcWB Natural logarithm of above variable 
Constant 
Dollar GDP 
GDPkEC Constant dollar GDP estimates from UNECLAC source 
logGDPkEC Natural logarithm of above variable 
GDPkpcEC Constant dollar per capita GDP estimates from UNECLAC 
source 
logGDPkpcEC Natural logarithm of above variable 
 
 
It is duly noted that an indication of Gross National Income (GNI) is perhaps a more 
advisable macroeconomic measure to use, as this includes the income of a country's residents and 
businesses, regardless of where it's produced, whereas GDP values are concerned with domestic 
production.  In particular, this distinction could be important for Caribbean countries, as some 
countries do rely on remittances or money transfers from abroad. However, a full GNI dataset for 
the countries selected was not available. 
Based on preliminary diagnostics using different data sources, I include within my model 
a variable for gross fixed capital formation, or net investment, which I expect to have a positive 
effect on GDP. This is since I expect a net increase in investment or fixed capital in a country (i.e. 
the additions of capital goods, such as equipment, tools, transportation assets, and electricity) to 
lead to increases in GDP, since countries need capital goods to replace the older ones that are used 
to produce goods and services. Next, I include variables which I expect may harm GDP, including 
storm disaster affected persons, the occurrence of a disaster year, and heavy rainfall event days. 
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As shown in Table 2-11, in the Appendix, which highlights a model looking only at a specific 
GDP outcome (UNECLAC source), there is a positive effect of gross fixed capital formation on 
GDP, as expected, regardless of the day of the week. Interestingly, the specification which 
highlights the indication of a heavy rainfall event on Mondays, in Column 2, show the negative 
effect of Monday heavy rainfall (i.e. the interaction term) on GDP with statistical significance, 
compared to non-Monday events. I also find that when using the actual number of heavy rain days 
on a Monday (as opposed to the occurrence of a heavy rain day by using the Monday heavy rainfall 
dummy variable), there seems to be some indication that heavy rainfall events on Mondays may 
lead to declines in annual GDP (see Table 2-12, in the Appendix).  
I also specifically test the effect of storm affected persons on various forms of GDP, as 
well as the natural logarithm of these variables, including variables such as gross fixed capital 
formation, the indication of a storm disaster, the number of heavy rain days, within the year. As 
shown in Table 2-13, in the Appendix, storm-affected persons likely hurt GDP. Most specifications 
show the signs I expect for other variables as well – a positive effect of investment and negative 
effect of the instance of a disaster, as well as the number of heavy rainfall days – and often with 
statistical significance. I also test other models showing the likely effects of preparedness through 
the influence of storm disaster-affected people on GDP. In the Appendix, Table 2-14 offers an 
insight into the relationship between storm affected persons in the previous year on current annual 
GDP, while Table 2-15 shares some indication that GDP is negatively affected by storm disasters 
in both the current and previous year. However, these results are not robust as similar results do 
not hold for all forms of GDP that are analyzed within this paper.  
Generally, the identification of these relationships with GDP offers some signal of the 
implications of heavy rainfall events beyond the proportion of people immediately affected by the 
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storm, perhaps leading to macroeconomic scale challenges. It is noted, however, that not all 
specifications show the same significance throughout, and as such this is not a fully robust 
conclusion. These findings suggest evidence of some association which may warrant further 
attention.  
2.5.2.b. Effects on other Macroeconomic Variables 
 
As an additional diagnostic of understanding the potential wide-ranging impacts of 
disasters, I look at the effect of people hurt by storms on various macroeconomic variables. Persons 
affected by storm disasters seem to have a negative effect on the current dollar value of imports 
on goods and services. As seen in Table 2-16 in the Appendix, for every percent increase of the 
population affected by a storm disaster, there is an approximate decrease of US $11.46 million. 
When considering a model with both storm disaster occurrence and affected people, as in Table 
2-17, I find that people affected by storms negatively affect the annual value of imports and exports 
of goods and services. As well, years in which there was a storm disaster are years when the log 
value of imports and exports are higher. I also consider lagged values of these variables, as shown 
in Table 2-18, which show similar results. 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
While my main research question is focused on whether or not there may be a difference 
of disaster outcomes by day of week, I began this paper rationalizing whether there may be some 
likely human aspect of disaster impacts. It would seem that adequate preparedness, including 
awareness and proactive strategies before disastrous events, could assist in minimizing detrimental 
impacts. Short storm forecast lead times, however, may hinder the ability of agencies to share 
information in an efficient and timely manner. As well, expert advice suggests that weekends may 
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offer limited communication, awareness and capacity amongst the local public as well as 
government and other disaster-related agencies and authorities, exacerbating short storm forecast 
lead times. Regression analysis using fixed effects, within a natural experiment research structure, 
helps me focus on finding whether there are differences of disaster or macroeconomic outcome by 
varying the occurrence of heavy rainfall events by day of week. I generally find that people are 
more impacted when there is a heavy rainfall event on Mondays, compared to events on other days 
of the week.  
In this paper, I focus on regression analysis of daily rainfall and a combination of disaster, 
macroeconomic, storm track and storm forecast data for 15 Caribbean countries over a 21 year 
period of 1990-2010. I find that heavy rainfall events on Mondays robustly show a significant 
positive relationship with the proportion of persons affected by storm disasters, implying that more 
people are hurt by Monday heavy rainfall events. Included results highlight regression 
specifications which accommodate different controls, differences in the years of observation (as 
not all years are noted disaster years), or differences in how the rainfall dummies are introduced, 
either all within the same regression (as in Table 2-2), or done separately (as shown in Table 2-6, 
Table 2-7, and Table 2-8). Given the short lead time for storm development for many Caribbean 
storms, and the challenges of disaster awareness and communication within the region (see Dookie 
& Osgood, 2018), such a finding that Mondays may have such a negative influence on people 
harmed by storms could highlight a particular gap in preparedness efforts as an interesting potential 
implication of the test. While these results do not automatically imply causality, the clean use of a 
natural experiment structure is helpful to better understand and contextualize these relationships.  
Importantly, while preparedness could be a valid discussion point in the consideration of 
risk reduction, it is also imperative to consider whether the noted impacts on Mondays may signal 
 
42 
a particular challenge of vulnerability on Mondays, or certain days of the week. Despite speaking 
with persons at meteorological offices and disaster agencies, attempting to review labor data, as 
well as considering cultural norms within the region, it is difficult to confirm a distinctive 
difference of vulnerability on Mondays compared to other days of the week. However, the concern 
of vulnerability by day of the week could be a valuable insight which should be further explored 
alongside the potential of improvements in disaster preparedness within the region. It is also of 
interest that in some specifications, such as Table 2-6 and Table 2-7, there seems to be a 
statistically significant negative relationship between the Saturday rainfall dummy and the 
proportion of persons affected by storms, implying that less people may be affected by Saturday 
rainfall. While this result could be due to less people in harm’s way on Saturdays, it might also 
refer to the possible effect of communication and preparedness during the work-week. 
As well, the results highlight that heavy rainfall events on Mondays themselves show some 
indication of negatively affecting annual GDP, and that storm disaster affected persons, in turn, 
may have some influence on macroeconomic indicators. If there is indeed a role of human action 
on disaster outcomes, these results could offer some encouragement that more preparedness could 
lead to country benefits, both in the short-run in terms of reduced numbers of people affected by 
storms, as well as in a long-run and wider sense through lessened macroeconomic impacts and 
consequences. While the idea of relating disaster events to macroeconomic consequences has been 
offered in Zapata & Madrigal (2009) through year before and year after event assessment of key 
macroeconomic variables (such as annual gross domestic product, both current and at constant 
prices, expressed in aggregate as well as per capita terms; value of imports and exports of goods 
and services; and value of external debt), the use of regression analysis within a natural experiment 
research structure here is helpful to further identify the relationships found. 
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Although the research has focused on a simple specification using the rainfall dependent 
variable in a crude binary form, , i.e. if there was or wasn’t a heavy rainfall event on a particular 
day of the week in that country in that year, the significance of the findings suggest that perhaps 
there may be some relationship worth further exploring. As such, given that I do see some 
association with the disaster outcome variables, a next step would be to further explore the 
relationship with more refined data, such as the number of days of heavy rainfall (which I began 
investigating in this paper, but which did not show robust significance), as well as the value of 
heavy rainfall by day of week. 
Hazard prediction and forecasting, and the economic study of the consequences of 
disasters, are important and active elements being researched within the scope of the disaster 
literature. However, also necessary to consider is the role of “sectoral planning to reduce human 
and economic losses that are setting back socio-economic development (Comment by Michel 
Jarraud, former Secretary General of the World Meteorological Organization, in UN and World 
Bank, 2010). The research has highlighted that human action may play a role in disaster outcomes, 
and preparedness could be a critical element of disaster risk reduction within such sectoral 
planning. Preparedness within the DRR context is seen to be a notion that has been encouraged by 
development agencies, but which has remained largely under-focused and under-funded. This 
research may offer a novel perspective of the role of preparedness towards sustainable 
development objectives and outcomes, and warrants further attention and research for deeper 
details by both academic investigators and development agencies. Since funding in the area of 
disaster prevention and preparedness has usually been quite low, it is the hope that research such 
as this could offer a real rationale for increased funding streams to better prepare communities for 
disaster impacts.  
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Specifically, the research potentially highlights the challenge of weekends in hindering 
government’s preparedness capacity to acknowledge and intervene regarding upcoming storm 
events. As well, it seems that Caribbean nationals may not have the usual access to official and 
unofficial information networks on weekends compared to weekdays. This information may offer 
some particular signals to regional and local policy-makers. One consideration may be to boost 
weekend disaster awareness and response capacity, perhaps especially during the hurricane/wet 
season. Additionally, better and/or new forms of information dissemination and dialogue with the 
local population should be investigated to best find the most appropriate forms of disseminating 
relevant information in a timely manner. A possible suggestion is to perhaps enlist and empower 
community leaders as local agents of information especially in rural parts which may not benefit 
from social media updates. Upgraded mechanisms of communication between forecast/climate 
information agencies, disaster and other development agencies, and the local public, should also 
be considered for improved disaster risk reduction. 
The potential of preparedness signals the need to increase and improve inter-linked 
research between storm modelling, storm forecasting and appropriate preparedness strategies, 
especially in developing and vulnerable areas such as the Caribbean. Such a thorough system of 
knowledge can offer governments more comprehensive information towards minimizing disaster 
impacts. In this vein, this study infers a complementary benefit of improving storm models and 
forecasts for these regions, to further support enhanced preparedness actions.  
These findings could also signal the need for improved understanding of disaster-affected 
people on national outcomes. Storm impacts affecting or displacing lives and livelihoods may have 
complex effects on a country’s economy, and such an understanding could assist disaster risk 
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management strategies to better assist affected persons following subsequent events, as well as 
inform national economic policy on how to best prepared and manage such potential impacts. 
Additional studies which could stem from this research include an improved understanding 
of vulnerability to disaster risk and impacts within the region, an insight into storm lead times in 
the context of preparedness and disaster management policies, as well as some intuition on whether 
the limitations of the weekend may affect the nature and precision of storm forecasts.    
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2-2: OECD donors’ bilateral humanitarian assistance by expenditure type, 2005−2014 
 
Source: Author’s based on OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1#. Shown in constant US dollar 2014 prices. 
Note: This figure is based on data of the amount and type of humanitarian assistance from the 30 member countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) to countries and territories eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA) over 2004-2015. The data 
does not reflect amounts by a particular country to a specific country or group of countries. This figure was included 
to highlight the proportion of resources offered to ex-ante disaster prevention and preparedness, compared to ex-post 
relief efforts.  
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Table 2-3: Summary of Disasters in the Caribbean, 1900-2015 
Disaster Group Disaster Type Occurrence Total Deaths 
Total 
Affected 
Total Damages 
(in millions US$) 
Hydrological 
Flood 138 6,266 4,372,876 980.5 
Landslide 7 443 2,435 0 
Meteorological Storm 318 
          
30,741  
22,344,503  35,176.7 
Climatological 
Drought 27 0 4,731,762 197.6 
Wildfire 5 0 0 1 
Biological Epidemic 29 686 771,963 0 
Geophysical 
Earthquake 14 223,971 3,798,263 8075 
Mass movement (dry) 1 40 0 0 
Volcanic Activity 10 31,599 110,403 8 
NATURAL HAZARD-BASED SUB-
TOTAL 
549       293,746  36,132,205  44,438.9 
Technological 
Industrial Accident 8 59 5,290 22.4 
Miscellaneous Accident 24 655 524,518 50.3 
Transport Accident 94 6,170 2,522 0 
ALL DISASTERS TOTAL 675       300,632   36,664,535  44,511.6 
 
Sum of Hydro-Met Disasters 463 
          
37,450  
      
26,719,814  
36,157.2 
% of Natural Hazard-based Sub-Total 84.3% 12.7% 74.0% 81.4% 
% of All Disaster Total 68.6% 12.5% 72.9% 81.2% 
Source: Data compilation from EM-DAT database, www.em-dat.be  
 
 
 
  
 
48 
Figure 2-3: Storm Track of Hurricane Michelle, October 29th to November 5th 2001 
 
Source: Captured from Historical Hurricane Tracks: https://www.coast.noaa.gov/hurricanes/  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Area of Disturbed Weather associated with Hurricane Michelle, October 28th 2001 
 
Source: UNECLAC (2001). Red areas highlight increased storm activity. 
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Figure 2-5: CHIRPS Satellite Imagery of Rainfall, Oct 29 – Nov 5 2001 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Source: Downloaded from IRI Data Library using UCSB CHIRPS daily global 0.05° 
precipitation data  
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Table 2-4: Heavy Rainfall by Country, 1990-2010 
 
# Total Heavy 
Rain Days, 
1990-2010 
% Total Heavy 
Rain Days, 
1990-2010 
Average # Heavy 
Rain Days,  
1990-2010 
Std. 
Dev 
Std. 
Error 
Antigua and Barbuda (ATG) 52 0.7% 2.5 1.601 0.349 
The Bahamas (BHS) 359 4.7% 17.1 3.590 0.783 
Barbados (BRB) 29 0.4% 1.4 1.117 0.244 
Belize (BLZ) 433 5.6% 20.6 6.037 1.317 
Cayman Islands (CYM) 187 2.4% 8.9 2.322 0.507 
Dominica (DMA) 197 2.6% 9.4 3.584 0.782 
Dominican Republic (DOM) 771 10.1% 36.7 
10.25
7 
2.238 
Grenada (GRD) 65 0.8% 3.1 2.047 0.447 
Haiti (HTI) 499 6.5% 23.8 7.169 1.564 
Jamaica (JAM) 382 5.0% 18.2 7.840 1.711 
St. Kitts and Nevis (KNA) 26 0.3% 1.2 1.179 0.257 
St. Lucia (LCA) 143 1.9% 6.8 2.562 0.559 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
(VCT) 
93 1.2% 4.4 2.541 0.555 
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) 262 3.4% 12.5 4.600 1.004 
Turks and Caicos Islands (TCA) 10 0.1% 0.5 0.602 0.131 
Rainfall data is summarized from UCSB CHIRPS daily global 0.05° precipitation data.  
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Table 2-5: Heavy Rainfall by Day of the Week, 1990-2010 
 
# Total Heavy 
Rain Days, 
1990-2010 
% Total Heavy 
Rain Days, 
1990-2010 
Average # Heavy 
Rain Days,  
1990-2010 
St. Dev St. Error 
SUNDAY 510 14.5% 24.3 4.649 1.015 
MONDAY 534 15.2% 25.4 6.201 1.353 
TUESDAY 468 13.3% 22.3 4.395 0.959 
WEDNESDAY 508 14.5% 24.2 6.555 1.430 
THURSDAY 477 13.6% 22.7 4.361 0.952 
FRIDAY 519 14.8% 24.7 5.081 1.109 
SATURDAY 492 14.0% 23.4 6.809 1.486 
Rainfall data is summarized from UCSB CHIRPS daily global 0.05° precipitation data.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Boxplot of Number of Heavy Rainfall Events by Day of Week 
 
Rainfall data is summarized from UCSB CHIRPS daily global 0.05° precipitation data.  
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Table 2-6: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on Storm Disaster Affected 
Population, including day of week simultaneously 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Storm Disaster Affected People as % of Total Population 
Disaster Years All Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Sunday Rainfall 
3.477 2.010 0.992 0.821 
(6.274) (4.946) (1.096) (1.073) 
Monday Rainfall 
6.714** 5.923 2.189* 2.195 
(2.560) (3.538) (1.096) (1.261) 
Tuesday Rainfall 
-9.931 -11.01 -3.086 -2.398 
(7.581) (8.198) (2.210) (2.156) 
Wednesday Rainfall 
8.030 10.59 1.331 0.823 
(6.830) (8.314) (1.654) (1.495) 
Thursday Rainfall 
2.873 2.696 0.523 0.704 
(5.057) (5.870) (0.669) (0.690) 
Friday Rainfall 
-1.351 -1.798 0.00985 -0.0516 
(3.945) (5.116) (0.987) (1.210) 
Saturday Rainfall 
-3.123 -3.982 -0.421 -0.948 
(3.435) (4.778) (0.889) (0.875) 
Year 
-183.5  -51.91  
(307.2)  (94.59)  
yrSq 
0.0459  0.0130  
(0.0768)  (0.0237)  
Constant 183,224 -0.542 51,769 -0.706 
 (307,054) (7.211) (94,499) (1.976) 
     
Observations 91 91 315 315 
R-squared 0.173 0.295 0.051 0.104 
Number of Country 15 15 15 15 
Country FE y y y y 
Year FE  y  y 
Table highlights the results of a fixed effects regression model predicting the proportion of storm-affected people 
based on an understanding of heavy rainfall by day of the week. Here, all dummies of daily rainfall are included in 
the same regression, including country fixed effects, and either a quadratic time trend (as in odd-numbered 
columns), or a year fixed effect (FE) (as in even-numbered columns). Columns 1-2 offer results for disaster-affected 
countries and years only, whereas Columns 3-4 offer all 315 observations (15 countries x 21 years). All columns 
show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-7: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on Storm Disaster Affected 
Population, including day of week individually (Country FE only) 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Storm Disaster Affected People as % of Total Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Sunday Rainfall 
0.274       
(6.678)       
Monday Rainfall 
 8.482**      
 (3.680)      
Tuesday Rainfall 
  -8.490     
  (6.341)     
Wednesday 
Rainfall 
   4.281    
   (4.800)    
Thursday Rainfall 
    2.158   
    (5.477)   
Friday Rainfall 
     -1.861  
     (3.386)  
Saturday 
Rainfall 
      -4.456** 
      (2.054) 
Year 
-78.75 -102.3 -120.3 -82.14 -77.24 -75.83 -94.89 
(262.1) (250.2) (276.1) (245.2) (243.4) (247.0) (244.7) 
yrSq 
0.0198 0.0256 0.0302 0.0206 0.0194 0.0191 0.0238 
(0.0656) (0.0626) (0.0691) (0.0613) (0.0609) (0.0618) (0.0612) 
Constant 
78,382 101,905 119,877 81,791 76,885 75,438 94,548 
(261,888) (249,910) (275,823) (244,965) (243,206) (246,831) (244,504) 
        
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.034 0.085 0.085 0.047 0.037 0.036 0.044 
Number of 
Country 
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Table highlights the results of a fixed effects regression model predicting the proportion of storm-affected people 
based on an understanding of heavy rainfall by day of the week. Here, the dummies of daily rainfall are included 
individually, including a quadratic time trend as well as country fixed effects, for disaster-affected countries and 
years only. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-8: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on Storm Disaster Affected 
Population, including day of week individually (Country and Year FE) 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Storm Disaster Affected People as % of Total Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Sunday Rainfall 
-3.258       
(6.122)       
Monday Rainfall 
 8.576*      
 (4.482)      
Tuesday Rainfall 
  -8.568     
  (6.889)     
Wednesday Rainfall 
   5.074    
   (6.403)    
Thursday Rainfall 
    2.430   
    (4.910)   
Friday Rainfall 
     -2.546  
     (5.226)  
Saturday Rainfall 
      -5.500** 
      (2.362) 
Constant 
-0.222 -7.701 4.777 -4.840 -3.641 0.159 3.421 
(2.867) (4.683) (5.643) (5.604) (2.980) (3.981) (2.958) 
        
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.171 0.206 0.213 0.182 0.170 0.170 0.178 
Number of Country 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Country & Year FE y y y y y y y 
Table offers a slight change from Table 2-6, with inclusion of year fixed effects instead of a quadratic time trend, 
including both country and year FE. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance 
levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-9: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on Storm Disaster Affected 
Population, including day of week individually for all countries and years (Country 
FE only) 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Storm Disaster Affected People as % of Total Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Sunday Rainfall 
0.852       
(1.124)       
Monday Rainfall 
 1.807*      
 (0.862)      
Tuesday Rainfall 
  -1.909     
  (1.254)     
Wednesday 
Rainfall 
   0.518    
   (1.176)    
Thursday Rainfall 
    0.566   
    (0.770)   
Friday Rainfall 
     0.107  
     (1.068)  
Saturday Rainfall 
      -0.351 
      (0.844) 
Year 
-40.71 -43.51 -40.66 -37.32 -35.77 -37.63 -37.24 
(88.93) (85.97) (87.87) (85.62) (82.86) (87.13) (85.51) 
yrSq 
0.0102 0.0109 0.0102 0.00936 0.00898 0.00944 0.00935 
(0.0223) (0.0215) (0.0220) (0.0214) (0.0207) (0.0218) (0.0214) 
Constant 
40,569 43,377 40,509 37,181 35,629 37,491 37,099 
(88,843) (85,891) (87,786) (85,540) (82,784) (87,052) (85,434) 
        
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
R-squared 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 
Number of Country 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Table offers a slight change from Table 2-6, with results offered for all countries and years within the sample, 
instead of disaster-affected countries and years onl, and including country FE. All columns show robust standard 
errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-10: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on Storm Disaster Affected 
Population, including different forms of Weekday vs. Weekend Heavy Rainfall 
Events  
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Storm Disaster Affected People as % of Total Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Weekday Rainfall (# days) 
0.146 0.115   
(0.221) (0.229)   
Weekend Rainfall (# days) 
0.153 0.0569   
(0.281) (0.427)   
Weekday Rainfall (dummy) 
  -3.127 -3.308 
  (3.969) (3.070) 
Weekend Rainfall (dummy) 
  -11.53 -10.82* 
  (7.953) (5.857) 
Year 
-90.70  -53.14  
(254.0)  (265.8)  
yrSq 
0.0228  0.0134  
(0.0635)  (0.0665)  
Constant 
90,325 -3.321 52,823 10.26* 
(253,779) (4.011) (265,631) (5.162) 
     
Observations 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.039 0.169 0.067 0.192 
Number of Country 15 15 15 15 
Country FE y y y y 
Year FE  y  y 
Table highlights the results of a fixed effects regression model predicting the proportion of storm-affected people 
based on an understanding of heavy rainfall by weekdays and weekends, both considering the number of heavy 
rainfall days as well as a binary indicator of the occurrence. Country fixed effects are included in all models, and a 
quadratic time trend is included in Columns 1 and 3, while a year fixed effect is included in Columns 2 and 4, for 
disaster-affected countries and years only. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance 
levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
 
57 
Table 2-11: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on one form of GDP 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: log (current per capita GDP - UNECLAC Source) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Total Affected Population -0.000905 -0.00122* -0.000591 -0.00112 -0.000960 -0.000892 -0.000844 
 (0.000508) (0.000678) (0.000461) (0.000653) (0.000546) (0.000533) (0.000486) 
Annual Number of Heavy 
Rain Days 
0.00328 0.0176** 0.000201 0.0104 -0.00160 0.00412 0.00132 
(0.00348) (0.00707) (0.00547) (0.00853) (0.00692) (0.00344) (0.00248) 
Storm Disaster Year  0.0112 0.00860 0.0101 0.00657 0.00921 0.0105 0.00935 
 (0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.0171) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0159) 
Log GFCF 0.640*** 0.637*** 0.638*** 0.637*** 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.639*** 
(0.0470) (0.0455) (0.0457) (0.0437) (0.0455) (0.0473) (0.0457) 
Sunday Rainfall 0.0250       
 (0.0213)       
Int [RainDays * Sun Rain] -0.00504       
(0.00388)       
Monday Rainfall  0.116***      
  (0.0275)      
Int [RainDays * Mon Rain]  -0.0193**      
 (0.00778)      
Tuesday Rainfall   0.0817***     
   (0.0210)     
Int [RainDays * Tues Rain]   -0.00273     
  (0.00467)     
Wednesday Rainfall    0.0914**    
    (0.0344)    
Int [RainDays * Wed Rain]    -0.0121    
   (0.00918)    
Thursday Rainfall     0.0154   
     (0.0309)   
Int [RainDays*Thurs Rain]     -0.000150   
    (0.00566)   
Friday Rainfall      0.0266  
      (0.0171)  
Int [RainDays * Fri Rain]      -0.00578  
     (0.00337)  
Saturday Rainfall       0.0669** 
       (0.0249) 
Int [RainDays * Sat Rain]       -0.00363 
      (0.00259) 
        
Constant 4.889*** 4.834*** 4.879*** 4.856*** 4.900*** 4.881*** 4.875*** 
 (0.274) (0.274) (0.258) (0.256) (0.252) (0.269) (0.259) 
        
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
R-squared 0.808 0.817 0.814 0.812 0.807 0.807 0.811 
Number of Country 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Table highlights the results of a fixed effects regression model predicting the natural log of one form of GDP 
(logGDP), which is the current per capita GDP using the UNECLAC source. The model includes a variety of 
predictor and interaction variables, including the total storm disaster affected population, annual number of heavy 
rainfall days, an indication of whether it was a storm disaster year, and Gross Fixed Capital Formation in log form. 
Int refers to interaction terms between the rainfall amount and the day of the week dummy. All columns show robust 
standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-12: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis of Monday Rainfall on various forms 
of GDP, including Country FE  
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDPcWB GDPcpcWB GDPcEC GDPcpcEC GDPkEC GDPkpcEC 
         
Monday – # 
Heavy Raindays 
-184.8 45.28 -184.3* 45.00 -261.2 -1.870 
(103.2) (59.14) (99.10) (55.66) (166.9) (43.12) 
logGFCF 
3.304*** 0.0103 3.208*** 0.0270 2.466*** 0.0625 
(0.136) (0.216) (0.133) (0.202) (0.108) (0.147) 
Year 
-16,724 -23,712 -19,620 -29,044 5,313 3,116 
(28,610) (21,899) (29,109) (18,569) (25,350) (13,529) 
yrSq 
4.204 6.019 4.927 7.342 -1.311 -0.730 
(7.158) (5.476) (7.284) (4.649) (6.333) (3.385) 
Constant 
1.663e+07 2.336e+07 1.953e+07 2.873e+07 -5.377e+06 -3.304e+06 
(2.859e+07) (2.189e+07) (2.908e+07) (1.854e+07) (2.537e+07) (1.352e+07) 
         
Observations   248 248 248 248 248 248 
R-squared   0.870 0.661 0.853 0.663 0.804 0.552 
# of Country   12 12 12 12 12 12 
Country FE   y y y y y y 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
logGDPcWB logGDPcpcWB logGDPcEC logGDPcpcEC logGDPkEC logGDPkpcEC 
         
Monday – # 
Heavy Raindays 
-0.00484 -0.00337 -0.00428 -0.00288 -0.00587 -0.00448 
(0.00381) (0.00499) (0.00394) (0.00489) (0.00611) (0.00594) 
logGFCF 
0.270*** 0.262*** 0.299*** 0.292*** 0.154* 0.147** 
(0.0560) (0.0728) (0.0520) (0.0450) (0.0710) (0.0605) 
Year 
0.00504 -0.153 -0.979 -1.132 1.143 0.989 
(1.792) (1.852) (1.749) (1.769) (1.240) (1.304) 
yrSq 
1.06e-05 4.78e-05 0.000254 0.000290 -0.000279 -0.000243 
(0.000448) (0.000463) (0.000438) (0.000443) (0.000309) (0.000325) 
Constant 
-46.90 122.4 945.0 1,110 -1,163 -998.3 
(1,791) (1,852) (1,747) (1,767) (1,244) (1,306) 
         
Observations   248 248 248 248 248 248 
R-squared   0.940 0.900 0.929 0.882 0.820 0.715 
# of Country   12 12 12 12 12 12 
Country FE   y y y y y Y 
Table highlights the results of a fixed effects regression model predicting various forms of GDP, in both raw and log 
form. The model includes the main predictor variable as the number of heavy rainfall event days on Mondays, as 
well as controls for Gross Fixed Capital Formation as well as a quadratic time trend (Year and yrsq). Country FE are 
also included. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2-13: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on various forms of GDP, including Country and Year FE 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDPcWB GDPcpcWB GDPcEC GDPcpcEC GDPkEC GDPkpcEC logGDPcWB logGDPcpcWB logGDPcEC logGDPcpcEC logGDPkEC logGDPkpcEC 
             
Affected People 
-12.49* 4.000 -11.98* 1.725 -11.14 1.847 -0.000497 -0.000501 -0.00110** -0.00109** -0.000727 -0.000719 
(6.028) (10.34) (5.905) (9.407) (6.311) (7.649) (0.000542) (0.000621) (0.000394) (0.000467) (0.000613) (0.000718) 
Number of Heavy 
Rain Days 
-67.65* 13.98 -73.71* 4.872 -77.45* -2.829 -0.000625 0.000970 -0.00225*** -0.000728 -0.00344** -0.00192 
(37.36) (18.43) (35.27) (16.97) (37.50) (16.40) (0.000588) (0.00103) (0.000554) (0.000985) (0.00156) (0.00182) 
Storm Disaster Year 
73.67 -665.7** 7.448 -530.9* 103.1 -370.0* 0.00428 -0.00749 0.0141 0.00196 0.0116 -0.000576 
(387.9) (242.3) (362.8) (254.6) (412.1) (193.5) (0.0141) (0.0220) (0.00880) (0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0143) 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCF) 
3.302*** -0.00166 3.206**
* 
0.00604 2.483*** 0.0549       
(0.147) (0.220) (0.142) (0.207) (0.109) (0.149)       
logGFCF 
      0.252*** 0.243** 0.289*** 0.281*** 0.131 0.123 
      (0.0699) (0.0844) (0.0592) (0.0451) (0.0871) (0.0696) 
Constant 
1,111** 4,421*** 1,598**
* 
5,014*** 3,628*** 7,629*** 5.362*** 6.813*** 5.289*** 6.735*** 6.604*** 8.051*** 
(373.2) (462.8) (270.5) (328.1) (397.6) (399.8) (0.415) (0.457) (0.332) (0.240) (0.465) (0.374) 
             
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
R-squared 0.873 0.691 0.857 0.693 0.809 0.591 0.943 0.904 0.932 0.886 0.827 0.725 
Number of Country 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Country & Year FE y y y y y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2-14: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression on various forms of GDP, using lagged Affected Persons predictor variable  
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDPcWB GDPcpcWB GDPcEC GDPcpcEC GDPkEC GDPkpcEC logGDPcWB logGDPcpcWB logGDPcEC logGDPcpcEC logGDPkEC logGDPkpcEC 
             
Total Affected 
(Previous Year) 
-29.24 0.904 -29.30 -2.698 -20.42 7.267 0.000854 0.000812 -8.42e-05 -0.000137 0.00186** 0.00183 
(22.46) (11.73) (22.27) (9.864) (16.09) (7.721) (0.00113) (0.00158) (0.000848) (0.00127) (0.000733) (0.00109) 
Constant 
1,596 5,376*** 2,092 6,101*** 4,307*** 6,904*** 6.761*** 8.031*** 6.906*** 8.172*** 7.423*** 8.542*** 
(1,612) (466.3) (1,355) (406.0) (1,203) (381.6) (0.0539) (0.0498) (0.0518) (0.0551) (0.0511) (0.0543) 
             
Observations 291 291 292 292 273 273 291 291 292 292 273 273 
R-squared 0.251 0.636 0.246 0.632 0.208 0.535 0.916 0.858 0.899 0.829 0.766 0.598 
Number of Country 15 15 15 15 13 13 15 15 15 15 13 13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2-15: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression on various forms of GDP, comparing current and lagged predictor variables 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDPcWB GDPcpcWB GDPcEC GDPcpcEC GDPkEC GDPkpcEC logGDPcWB logGDPcpcWB logGDPcEC logGDPcpcEC logGDPkEC logGDPkpcEC 
             
Storm Affected People 
(Current Year) 
-36.89 11.04 -36.56 7.975 -29.30 3.958 0.000391 0.000631 -0.000407 -0.000156 1.57e-05 0.000190 
(25.79) (10.39) (24.89) (9.282) (22.52) (9.012) (0.000597) (0.000744) (0.000431) (0.000485) (0.000858) (0.00105) 
Storm Affected People 
(Previous Year) 
-49.91 28.55* -51.15 20.31 -37.14 23.28*** 0.00110 0.00161 -0.000341 0.000182 0.00218* 0.00262* 
(40.65) (14.33) (40.73) (12.46) (34.40) (6.719) (0.00133) (0.00157) (0.00112) (0.00140) (0.00101) (0.00135) 
Storm Disaster Event 
(Current Year) 
605.2 -688.1** 580.0 -548.4** 515.5 -382.3** -0.0282 -0.0425 -0.00406 -0.0188 -0.0112 -0.0254 
(734.9) (237.4) (697.0) (247.6) (671.1) (161.9) (0.0218) (0.0271) (0.0176) (0.0220) (0.0264) (0.0275) 
Storm Disaster Event 
(Previous Year) 
802.8 -927.5*** 847.3 -774.4*** 657.3 -559.9*** -0.00829 -0.0240 0.00748 -0.00878 -0.0146 -0.0271 
(763.0) (217.4) (768.8) (201.3) (773.6) (139.9) (0.0156) (0.0183) (0.0149) (0.0175) (0.0241) (0.0225) 
Constant 1,588 6,151*** 1,719 6,559*** 4,016** 6,986*** 6.861*** 8.131*** 6.926*** 8.196*** 7.411*** 8.527*** 
 (1,609) (498.8) (1,602) (409.1) (1,510) (309.9) (0.0579) (0.0634) (0.0501) (0.0531) (0.0716) (0.0665) 
             
Observations 279 279 279 279 260 260 279 279 279 279 260 260 
R-squared 0.262 0.648 0.257 0.642 0.221 0.556 0.915 0.852 0.898 0.828 0.768 0.611 
Number of Country 15 15 15 15 13 13 15 15 15 15 13 13 
Country & Year FE y y y y y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2-16: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression on various macroeconomic variables 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ExtDebtm GFCFm NetODApc ExportsGSm ImportsGSm FoodYiMerchY logExtDebt logGFCF logODApc logExports logImports 
            
Affected People 
-0.0182 -6.431 0.202 -10.27 -11.46* 0.0379** -0.398** 0.00150 0.00363 -0.00250 -0.00194 
(0.0492) (5.138) (0.283) (6.320) (5.633) (0.0153) (0.138) (0.00110) (0.00247) (0.00256) (0.00185) 
Year 
103.5 -11,370 -4,470* -7,320 -9,965** -79.61* -52.40** 3.432 -25.25*** 1.772 0.949 
(65.42) (13,978) (2,088) (13,135) (4,535) (37.36) (19.27) (2.477) (8.476) (2.763) (1.983) 
yrSq 
-0.0260 2.863 1.117* 1.861 2.528** 0.0198* 0.0131** -0.000842 0.00631*** -0.000429 -0.000221 
(0.0164) (3.505) (0.521) (3.291) (1.140) (0.00933) (0.00483) (0.000619) (0.00212) (0.000691) (0.000495) 
Constant 
-102,950 1.129e+07 4.471e+06* 7.195e+06 9.820e+06** 79,870* 52,341** -3,491 25,252*** -1,821 -1,009 
(65,385) (1.394e+07) (2.090e+06) (1.311e+07) (4.509e+06) (37,406) (19,229) (2,478) (8,483) (2,761) (1,986) 
            
Observations 269 248 283 284 284 212 36 248 261 284 284 
R-squared 0.245 0.183 0.073 0.205 0.313 0.298 0.220 0.769 0.061 0.633 0.781 
Number of Country 13 12 15 14 14 13 6 12 15 14 14 
Country FE y y y y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
 
6
1
 
Table 2-17: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression on various macroeconomic variables, with control for Storm Occurrence 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ExtDebtm GFCFm NetODApc ExportsGSm ImportsGSm FoodYiMerchY logExtDebt logGFCF logODApc logExports logImports 
            
Affected People 
-0.0191 -11.04 0.303 -12.48* -17.31* 0.0336* -0.332* 0.00121 0.00191 -0.00348 -0.00284 
(0.0573) (8.074) (0.251) (6.674) (8.492) (0.0179) (0.146) (0.00105) (0.00287) (0.00298) (0.00219) 
Storm Occurrence 
0.0537 282.6 -6.203 132.0 350.4 0.149 -0.229 0.0182 0.104 0.0590* 0.0538* 
(0.874) (209.2) (13.64) (252.8) (253.6) (0.331) (0.293) (0.0256) (0.100) (0.0322) (0.0294) 
Year 
103.4 -12,006 -4,465* -7,567 -10,621** -79.79* -60.72** 3.391 -25.34*** 1.662 0.848 
(65.72) (14,652) (2,105) (12,650) (4,574) (37.31) (18.66) (2.516) (8.512) (2.714) (1.998) 
yrSq 
-0.0260 3.021 1.116* 1.923 2.691** 0.0199* 0.0152** -0.000832 0.00634*** -0.000402 -0.000196 
(0.0164) (3.673) (0.525) (3.170) (1.151) (0.00932) (0.00468) (0.000629) (0.00213) (0.000679) (0.000499) 
Constant 
-102,885 1.193e+07 4.466e+06* 7.444e+06 1.048e+07** 80,050* 60,650** -3,450 25,341** -1,709 -907.7 
(65,679) (1.461e+07) (2.107e+06) (1.262e+07) (4.545e+06) (37,354) (18,612) (2,518) (8,518) (2,713) (2,000) 
            
Observations 269 248 283 284 284 212 36 248 261 284 284 
R-squared 0.245 0.193 0.073 0.206 0.322 0.299 0.243 0.769 0.064 0.637 0.783 
Number of 
Country 
13 12 15 14 14 13 6 12 15 14 14 
Country FE y y y y y y y y y y y 
 
 
Table 2-18: Summary of Fixed Effects Regression on various macroeconomic variables, with current & lagged predictor variables 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
ExtDebtm GFCFm NetODApc ExportsGSm ImportsGSm FoodYiMerchY logExtDebt logGFCF logODApc logExports logImports 
            
Storm Affected People 
(Current Year) 
6.948*** -275.7 -24.01 -477.4 -433.5 0.510 124.9*** 0.0448 0.0219 0.213 0.0299 
(2.151) (349.0) (20.85) (516.4) (405.7) (0.326) (21.37) (0.0444) (0.210) (0.171) (0.152) 
Storm Affected People 
(Previous Year) 
-6.884*** 262.7 24.04 461.5 413.7 -0.461 -122.7*** -0.0427 -0.0202 -0.214 -0.0319 
(2.145) (339.1) (20.50) (506.5) (396.6) (0.324) (20.93) (0.0435) (0.206) (0.170) (0.152) 
Storm Disaster Event 
(Current Year) 
0.271 292.6 -4.742 105.6 316.7 -0.0671 -0.0566 0.0188 0.161 0.0602* 0.0544 
(0.879) (209.5) (16.40) (220.2) (220.1) (0.346) (0.298) (0.0307) (0.125) (0.0303) (0.0318) 
Storm Disaster Event 
(Previous Year) 
0.437 205.7 22.49 187.0 241.9 -0.0892 -0.0442 0.0589* 0.134 0.0877** 0.0682** 
(1.401) (116.1) (27.25) (134.6) (175.5) (0.355) (0.152) (0.0291) (0.0996) (0.0320) (0.0309) 
Year 
93.82 -14,217 -5,188* -7,294 -12,399** -94.38** -76.81*** 5.486 -28.70** 2.604 1.616 
(67.74) (17,802) (2,603) (11,293) (5,548) (38.54) (17.98) (3.230) (10.94) (2.514) (2.150) 
yrSq 
-0.0236 3.573 1.296* 1.855 3.135** 0.0235** 0.0192*** -0.00135 0.00717** -0.000637 -0.000387 
(0.0169) (4.459) (0.650) (2.831) (1.395) (0.00962) (0.00450) (0.000807) (0.00273) (0.000628) (0.000537) 
Constant 
-93,247 1.414e+07 5.190e+06* 7.172e+06 1.226e+07** 94,660** 76,725*** -5,546 28,703** -2,651 -1,675 
(67,719) (1.777e+07) (2.606e+06) (1.126e+07) (5.515e+06) (38,578) (17,979) (3,232) (10,949) (2,515) (2,153) 
            
Observations 256 236 268 271 271 205 33 236 246 271 271 
R-squared 0.250 0.192 0.083 0.204 0.326 0.301 0.318 0.770 0.066 0.638 0.782 
Number of Country 13 12 15 14 14 13 6 12 14 14 14 
Country FE y y y y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 3. Storm Forecasting for the Caribbean: Are some 
forecasters better than others? 
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Abstract 
Storm forecasting has improved greatly in recent years, especially when it comes to storm 
tracking or determining where a tropical cyclone may go. Tracking errors for tropical storms have 
decreased over time, leading to reduced sizes of zones under storm warnings and evacuation, and 
enabling better targeting of resources to potentially-affected areas. Despite this improvement in 
storm location, the forecasting of storm intensity, in terms of the strength of the storm that is 
included in storm advisories, seems to be less understood. As well, while much of the focus on 
improvement in hurricane forecasting has been attributed to better computers and advanced data 
collection and modelling techniques, weather forecasting requires active human insight. As this is 
also an understudied area of research, and in an effort to understand the role of humans in making 
consistent or accurate advisory outcomes, there is a need to ask: do people influence good 
forecasts? Are person-specific characteristics a possible factor affecting a consistent advisory? Are 
some forecasters better than others? 
To look at this, I explore a natural experiment research structure to focus on the likely 
effect of the issuing forecaster on the consistency of a storm advisory. To determine consistency, 
I consider the difference between the type of storm intensity in the issued advisories and the actual 
storm intensity at island impact, using both a simple binary indicator as well as a categorical 
indicator based on the type of difference in intensity. I utilize a compiled dataset of 2,420 United 
States National Hurricane Center-issued storm advisories for 14 Caribbean islands for an 18-year 
period, 1998-2015, within which I have information on the lead forecaster responsible for each 
issued advisory. Using regression analysis, my findings show that, despite having access to the 
same technology, forecasting models and data, some forecasters may produce consistent forecasts 
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more than others. As well, more experienced forecasters may be associated with less low-level 
errors, but also more high-level errors, in the type of difference in storm intensity. 
While there are concerns regarding the level of caution in issuing advisories at the National 
Hurricane Center, and the nature of rapid intensifying storms, such research may be indicative of 
the important human aspect in assimilating and utilizing climate information. This may not only 
have implications on the outcome of the advisory, but also the nature of and supplies required for 
tailored preparedness strategies by resource-conscious Caribbean countries.  
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3.1 Introduction  
 
As climate information is being developed for use within climate risk management, its 
effective use in decision-making processes may depend on several factors, including the accuracy 
and reliability, as well as timely communication, of such information. While there has been some 
focus on how to communicate risk and weather/climate information, such as through work by 
Rebecca Morss and others through project ‘Communicating Hazard Information in the Modern 
Environment’, improving accuracy and reliability is largely seen in the context of improving the 
science and technology to understand natural hazards.  
In the context of tropical cyclones, storm forecasting has been significantly improving over 
time, due largely to “better computer modeling, more powerful supercomputers, more advanced 
methods to collect and ingest data into these models (particularly from satellites), and improved 
techniques to blend these models into a single forecast”. 28 This has particularly benefited the 
understanding of where storms will go, and tracking errors for tropical storms have decreased over 
time. While such efforts have led to reduced sizes of zones under storm warnings and evacuation 
and better targeting of resources to potentially-affected areas, countries may still face challenges 
in terms of their preparedness for potential threats. Preparation efforts for a tropical storm may 
likely be quite different for a major hurricane. Given the limited resources in many of the 
Caribbean small islands, for instance, such knowledge of the accuracy of storm intensity may be 
helpful to discern and offer priority in responsiveness to storm events. This is yet a dynamic area 
of forecasting research development.  
                                                                
28 See Berger, 2019. “Hurricane forecasts may be running headlong into the butterfly effect”. ARS Technica. 8/12/2019, 10:45 
AM. Available at: https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/08/hurricane-forecasters-may-be-reaching-the-limits-of-predictability/ 
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As well, it is also interesting to note that while much of the focus on improvement in 
hurricane forecasting has been attributed to improved technological resources, forecasting still 
requires active human insight. In an effort to understand the role of humans in these accurate or 
consistent advisory outcomes, it may be of interest to ask: do people influence good forecasts? Are 
person-specific characteristics a possible factor affecting a consistent advisory? Are some 
forecasters better than others? The United States National Hurricane Center (NHC) explicitly 
states that an official forecast “reflects consideration of all available model guidance as well as 
forecaster experience” (NHC, 2017 December). At a 2018 conference on risk and disaster 
reduction at University College London, the Head of Space Weather at the UK Meteorological 
Office highlighted that traditional weather/event forecasting perhaps requires 75% technological 
inputs and 25% human involvement (UCL, 2018). Noting this core role, the input of human 
contributions in forecasts becomes potentially important in the improvement and consistency of 
issued advisories.  
Since storm development is largely exogenous, and all forecasters within the US National 
Hurricane Center have access to the same data and technology, and, as well, the assignment of 
forecasters to issue advisories for developing storms does not seem to follow any particular pattern, 
I am able to utilize a natural experiment research structure to study whether people may have an 
impact on advisory consistency. This would allow me to understand whether person-specific 
characteristics may influence some forecasters to make consistent outcomes more than others. 
Through regression analysis, I use a series of linear probability models to analyze a compiled 
dataset of 2,420 US National Hurricane Center-issued storm advisories for 14 Caribbean islands 
for an 18-year period, 1998-2015, to focus on the likely effect of the issuing forecaster on the 
consistency of a storm advisory. To determine consistency, I consider the difference between the 
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type of storm intensity in the issued advisories and the actual storm intensity at island impact, 
using both a simple binary indicator as well as a categorical indicator based on the type of 
difference in intensity.  
The potential that the lead forecaster issuing an advisory may play a role in its consistency 
outcome could be an interesting research discovery. Not only could it encourage a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors which influence discrepancies in consistency, but also offer more 
focus to forecaster capability and knowledge alongside the ardent encouragement of technological 
input within the forecasting process. As well, it may stimulate further collaboration amongst 
forecasters and between Caribbean-based meteorological offices.  
The paper begins with a general overview of storm forecasting and a review of research 
connecting people to outcomes, before describing the data and methods used. I then present some 
of the main findings, focusing on the effect of forecasters but also including results considering 
the likely predictability of the storm, as well as the day of week of the forecast. I close by offering 
an understanding of the role of forecaster experience on consistent outcomes, as well as suggesting 
possible research avenues to improve on this study, such as the need to better define and understand 
storm advisory consistency. 
3.2 Background  
3.2.1. Storm Forecasting: Scientific Models and Hurricane Specialists 
 
Alongside the understanding the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones in a warming 
climate, improving the certainty and accuracy of storm forecasts has been of priority to national 
and international agencies, and the related scientific community. Of note, the United States 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hurricane Forecast Improvement 
Program (HFIP) specifically aims to “improve the accuracy and reliability of hurricane forecasts; 
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to extend lead time for hurricane forecasts with increased certainty; and to increase confidence in 
hurricane forecasts” (HFIP, 2018). Towards improving NOAA's forecast services and reducing 
average errors of hurricane track and intensity forecasts, the Program suggests major investments 
in “enhanced observational strategies, improved data assimilation, numerical model systems, and 
expanded forecast applications based on the high resolution and ensemble-based numerical 
prediction systems” (HFIP, 2018). This is expected to “lead to improved public response, including 
savings of life and property” as improved accuracy and reliability of forecasts is associated with 
improved user confidence.  
An arm of the United States’ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
National Weather Service (NWS) and comprised of nine distinct Centers, the National Centers for 
Environmental Prediction (NCEP) is the starting point for all weather forecasts in the United States 
and is a critical resource in national and global weather prediction (NCEP, 2015). Although it is 
one of the nine centers of the US-based NCEP, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) in Miami, 
Florida has been designated by the World Meteorological Organization as a Regional Specialized 
Meteorological Center (RSMC) with responsibilities for monitoring and forecasting tropical 
cyclones in the Atlantic basin (including the North Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
Caribbean Sea) and Northeast Pacific basin east of 140W (from Mexico to about the dateline)29 – 
see areas 1 and 2 in Figure 3-1. Specifically, when a tropical cyclone is active within this region, 
the Hurricane Specialist Unit (HSU) of the NHC “issues tropical cyclone advisory packages 
comprising a suite of official text and graphical products” (NHC, 2017, June). Forecasters, or 
hurricane specialists, are meteorologists within the HSU who monitor storm activity and issue 
relevant advisories, including tropical cyclone watches and warnings, for the US mainland and 
                                                                
29 See http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/F1.html  
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territories, as well as on behalf of/in coordination with other meteorological services within the 
WMO’s Region IV (including Caribbean islands and territories). 
A critical part of this forecasting is the suite of data and scientific models. The NHC/HSU-
issued tropical storm track and intensity forecasts are based on the guidance of a range of forecast 
models, defined as “any objective tool used to generate a prediction of a future event, such as the 
state of the atmosphere” (NHC, 2017, December). As described by the NHC, models may vary 
widely in structure and complexity: there are dynamical/numeric atmospheric physics-based 
models, statistical models which consider historical relationships between storm behavior and 
storm specifics such as location or date, statistical-dynamic models which are a combination of 
the two, trajectory models, as well as ensemble models which are a combination of other forecast 
models. While some models may take hours to run on supercomputers, others are simpler in nature, 
and whereas some may be available early in the forecast cycle, others, such as multi-layer 
dynamical models, are considered late and may require adjustment (see 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/modelsummary.shtml for a summary of models used by NHC).  
Importantly, the NHC states that an official forecast “reflects consideration of all available 
model guidance as well as forecaster experience” (NHC, 2017, December). Around the hurricane 
season, from May to November, whenever a storm develops, hurricane specialists work around 
the clock to issue forecast advisories every six hours until the storm is over (public advisories may 
be issued more frequently depending on storm intensity and imminent threat to land), coordinating 
with officials in each country that is likely to be affected. Since each storm is different and models 
are based on different processes and require interpretation and analysis, forecasters “must evaluate 
the strengths and weaknesses of each model’s output before producing their official forecast … 
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[using] their experience and judgment to decide how to use the individual and ensemble model 
guidance to produce the best possible forecast” (Hurricane Science, 2015). 
Improving the accuracy and reliability of hurricane forecasts is an essential part of NOAA’s 
work. NHC provides detailed information on the verification of its past forecasts with a yearly 
verification report. On average, NHC official forecasts usually have smaller errors than any of the 
individual models. As well, particular attention has been given to the accuracy of forecast location, 
as represented by the ‘cone of uncertainty.’ While the NHC annually revises the cone based on 
error statistics compiled over the previous five hurricane seasons (Belles, 2017), it has improved 
greatly within the recent past in terms of track errors and forecasts. In response to devastating 
storms in 2004-2005 (including Hurricane Katrina), in June 2007 the Hurricane Forecast 
Improvement Project (HFIP) was established within NOAA with goals to systematically reduce 
average track errors, reduce average intensity errors, increase the probability of detection, and 
extend the lead-time for hurricane forecasts out to Day 7 (NOAA, 2017). Recent remarks by 
scientists at the US National Hurricane Center (NHC) have included that between “the period of 
1990 through 2016, the three-day track error for tropical storms and hurricanes in the Atlantic 
Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico declined from 555km to 185km, dramatically reducing 
the size of hurricane warning and evacuation zone areas.” 28 Furthermore, the 2017 HFIP Annual 
Report states that there has in fact been a 20% reduction in both storm track and intensity numerical 
guidance, and further efforts are being made to assist and address burgeoning forecast challenges 
such as rapid intensity change, genesis, storm size, and rainfall, as demonstrated by the 2017 
hurricane season and storms such as Harvey, Irma, and Maria.  
To encourage developments in these areas, the HFIP states that it will require “major 
investments in enhanced observational strategies, improved data assimilation, numerical model 
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systems, and expanded forecast applications based on the high resolution and ensemble-based 
numerical prediction systems” (HFIP, 2018), and is aligned with inter-agency and larger scientific 
community efforts. Not explicitly mentioned in this outlook, however, is the role of the forecasters 
themselves, and if there were any specific efforts being made to enhance and encourage the 
capacity and capability of forecasters to effectively utilize and interact with the updated 
knowledge. 
3.2.2. Do People Influence Outcomes? 
 
To better understand the likely influence of forecasters on consistent storm outcomes, I 
look to the available literature connecting individual characteristics with certain outcomes. In 
economics, the focus on person-specific characteristics and details, and in particular the role of 
experience, has been principally evident in models concerning wage outcomes. The Mincer 
earning function (Mincer, 1974) is a hallmark economic model which estimates the returns of 
education by explaining wage income as a function of schooling and work experience, thereby 
focusing on one of the most important empirical questions related to labor economics and 
economic studies on education, especially in developing countries. In this model, the logarithm of 
earnings or wages is usually modelled as the sum of the years of education and a quadratic function 
of years of (potential) labor market experience. Analysis of the coefficients of the model offers an 
interpretation of the returns to schooling and the returns to experience/entering the workforce, and 
there have been many updates and revisions to test this model in a variety of countries under 
different conditions. 
Elsewhere, the personnel economics literature offers insights into how firms work in the 
sense of “human resource management practices like compensation, hiring practices, training, and 
teamwork” (Lazear & Shaw, 2007), and the role of worker experience and skill may play a part in 
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this understanding. Generally, the business community has also valued insights on group dynamics 
and the factors which impact team performance in the workplace, and as well it is often thought 
that diverse teams may be an influencing factor in driving innovation.  
Research connecting individual characteristics with outcomes has also been well-noted 
within the medical profession. Anecdotally, it is thought that doctors with more experience are 
usually believed to have more accumulated knowledge and skills and may influence more positive 
outcomes. In one paper, a subset of nearly 4000 hospitalists were evaluated for each of their first 
4 years of hospitalist practice, and “compared with the second year of practice, the first year of 
practice was associated with significantly higher in-hospital mortality” (Goodwin et al., 2018). In 
another, Florida and New York-practicing obstetricians with more years of experience had fewer 
maternal complications over the first three decades of practice (Epstein et al., 2013). However, 
there is also some evidence which suggests that there may be an inverse relationship (Meisel & 
Pines, 2012). In a study to identify whether surgeon characteristics may be associated with 
mortality or morbidity following carotid endarterectomy (CEA), it was found that “a greater 
number of years since the surgeon was licensed was associated with greater mortality,” although 
not with morbidity or bad outcome rates (O’Neill et al., 2000). As well, a recent study in the BMJ, 
a leading medical journal, showed a particular negative relationship between medical outcomes 
and physician’s age: “patients treated by older physicians experienced statistically significantly 
higher mortality rates than patients cared for by younger physicians” (Tsugawa, Newhouse et al., 
2017). This could be perhaps due to updates in medical practices and advancements over time.  
Other interesting findings include the observations that the physician’s medical school may 
influence a patient’s length of stay in a hospital (Burns et al., 1991), that a doctor’s medical training 
at a prestigious institution was associated with identification as a "best" doctor but not with lower 
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mortality ratios (Hartz et al., 1999; also see Tsugawa et al., 2018), and that “patients treated by 
international graduates had lower mortality than patients cared for by US graduates” based on data 
on older Medicare patients admitted to hospital in the US (Tsugawa, Jena et al., 2017). As well, it 
was found that a primary care physician's experience with/prior knowledge of a patient has a 
significant effect on resource use and patient outcomes in the hospital as well as during the post-
discharge period (Stevens et al., 2017). 
3.3 Data 
 
Before testing the influence of individual forecasters in making consistent forecasts, I first 
collated a relevant dataset. This study capitalizes on the explicit mentioning of the forecaster’s 
name, alongside the storm name, country likely to be affected, date, time, and type of forecast 
within an NHC-issued storm advisory. This study benefits from data over the 1998-2015 period. 
While the web-based advisories are available 1998 to present, I am aware that there were changes 
in the timing and issuing of forecasts from 2016 onward. To ensure some sense of consistency of 
the advisories issued, I focused only on pre-2016 data. I focus on advisories issued for 14 
Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. This data is combined with storm track and storm advisory 
data, as described below. In doing these steps, I arrived at 2,420 advisories issued by 22 national 
hurricane specialists, or forecasters, at the US National Hurricane Center for the selected 14 
countries within the period 1998-2015. A table of summary statistics is available in Table 3-2. 
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3.3.1. Storm Forecast Data from Advisories 
 
The NHC maintains an online archive of tropical cyclone forecasts/advisories for the 
Atlantic region, beginning with Tropical Storm Alex on Monday, July 27, 1998, (see 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/1998). Within 1998-2015, the period of this study’s 
consideration, there were some 291 tropical cyclones listed for which there were NHC-issued 
Tropical Cyclone Forecasts/Advisories. As noted on the NHC’s website, a NHC-issued Tropical 
Cyclone Forecast/Advisory contains a list of all current watches and warnings for a tropical or 
subtropical cyclone and the country/territory likely to be affected. There are four main forecast 
issuances possible in a storm advisory (NHC, 2018): 
a) Tropical Storm Watch: An announcement that sustained winds of 34 to 63 knots (39 to 
73 mph or 63 to 118 km/hr) are possible within the specified area within 48 hours in 
association with a tropical, subtropical, or post-tropical cyclone. 
b) Tropical Storm Warning: An announcement that sustained winds of 34 to 63 knots (39 to 
73 mph or 63 to 118 km/hr) are expected somewhere within the specified area within 36 
hours in association with a tropical, subtropical, or post-tropical cyclone. 
c) Hurricane Watch: An announcement that sustained winds of 64 knots (74 mph or 119 
km/hr) or higher are possible within the specified area in association with a tropical, 
subtropical, or post-tropical cyclone. Because hurricane preparedness activities become 
difficult once winds reach tropical storm force, the hurricane watch is issued 48 hours in 
advance of the anticipated onset of tropical storm force winds. 
d) Hurricane Warning: An announcement that sustained winds of 64 knots (74 mph or 119 
km/hr) or higher are expected somewhere within the specified area in association with a 
tropical, subtropical, or post-tropical cyclone. Because hurricane preparedness activities 
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become difficult once winds reach tropical storm force, the warning is issued 36 hours in 
advance of the anticipated onset of tropical-storm-force winds. The warning can remain 
in effect when dangerously high water or a combination of dangerously high water and 
waves continue, even though winds may be less than hurricane force. 
In addition to the forecast of watches and warnings, the advisory includes the date and time 
of each forecast, the current latitude and longitude coordinates, intensity, and system motion, and 
may also contain information on potential storm tides associated with the cyclone, as well as any 
pertinent weather observations (see Figure 3-2 for a snapshot of an advisory issued for Tropical 
Storm Erika at 2100 UTC, Wednesday 26th August 2015).  
Each storm is likely to have multiple storm advisories, even per country. I gathered data 
for each storm advisory within the period performing a web-scrape of the NHC website. This data 
was then manually reviewed and cleaned to arrive at a list of all the advisories issued for each 
storm for each of the 14 countries within the scope of this research. This process proved quite 
arduous, and assistance from several interns was requested.  
It is worth mentioning that these storm forecasts represent official watches and warnings 
issued on behalf of respective countries/territories by the NHC. Personal communication with staff 
of several Caribbean meteorological agencies reveal that there is a process of communication and 
information transfer between the NHC and local meteorological agencies and/or government 
authorities, which may or may not be resident in the affected island, before such forecasts are made 
officially/publicly available. It is noted that this process may delay or have other consequences on 
the transfer and real-time availability of forecast information, but cannot be captured or fully 
understood at this time. 
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3.3.2. Forecaster Data 
 
The advisories also contained the name of the forecaster(s) responsible for issuing the 
forecast, and through the above process, I also recorded the names associated with each advisory 
(see Table 3-1). In the case of a group of forecasters, only the first person on the advisory was 
retained as the lead/responsible forecaster for that advisory (there was only a small percentage of 
these advisories done as a group).  
For information on forecaster experience, I also collated information on the forecaster’s 
starting year of work at the NHC by reviewing the Staff Biographies30 on the NHC’s website, as 
well as a review of online records of interviews/Q&As with former staff, where possible. I 
calculated the forecaster experience in years by taking the difference between the forecaster’s start 
year as a hurricane specialist at the NHC and the year of the relevant storm advisory. I was able to 
ascertain forecaster experience information for 15 hurricane specialists, which accounted for 2,208 
issued advisories (91.2% of all available) for the selected countries within the period.  
3.3.3. Storm Intensity at Approach/Landfall 
 
To understand the intensity of the storm at approach/landfall, I utilized information on the 
NOAA Office of Coastal Management website, Historical Hurricane Tracks31. Without using 
improved software or programming, I collected data on the storms’ track across the Caribbean 
Basin, specifically noting the date, time, and storm characteristics at the time of landfall or 
otherwise closest point of approach to any of the 14 countries in question. While I utilized the 
standard definition of landfall as per the NHC Glossary of Terms32 (occurring at the intersection 
                                                                
30 See: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutstaff.shtml 
31 See: https://www.coast.noaa.gov/hurricanes/ 
32 In the NHC Glossary of Terms, a few relevant definitions are made: a direct hit is a close approach of a tropical cyclone to a 
particular location; landfall occurs at the intersection of the surface center of a tropical cyclone with a coastline; a hurricane strike 
occurs if that location passes within the hurricane's strike circle; and an indirect hit refers to locations that do not experience a 
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of the surface center of a tropical cyclone with a coastline), I also considered whether a storm came 
within a close point of approach to an island, for instance within 100 and 200 nautical miles 
depending on island size. While this yielded a conservative number of storms, as estimation was 
done by eyeballing the various storms within the required distance from the coastline, such a 
relatively wide swath around the island was used since extensive rain bands could have impact on 
a country and I wanted to ensure that I could capture this level of detail. I also collated country-
level data on the number of storms and major storms, or those storms of Category 3, 4, or 5 on the 
Saffir-Simpson scale, which could have affected the island. 
3.3.4. Defining Storm Advisory Outcome Variables  
 
For the purposes of this paper, I define the storm advisory outcome variables in two ways. 
For both, I look at the type of storm intensity as advised in the advisory to see if it is consistent 
with the storm intensity at landfall or close approach to a country. As described in Section 3.3.1, 
issued storm advisories indicate 2 broad categories of potential storm alerts: a tropical storm 
(watch or warning), and a hurricane (watch or warning). However, when a storm has made landing, 
or has come close enough to an island to make an impact, I have data on the actual wind-speed 
intensity at that time. I code these wind-speed intensities according to the Saffir-Simpson scale 
storm categories (see Table 4-8), from 1 (a tropical depression), to 7 (a Category 5 hurricane). 
In comparing these two data sources, I am able to firstly calculate an outcome variable 
“consistent” as binary, yes (1) or no (0), if the advisory of the storm type was consistent with the 
storm wind-speed at impact. The benefit of using such a coarse understanding of this consistency 
between the storm type and wind-speed at impact is to offer a basic and simple understanding of 
                                                                
direct hit from a tropical cyclone, but do experience hurricane force winds (either sustained or gusts) or tides of at least 4 feet 
above normal.  
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the relationship between this outcome of advisory accuracy and the lead forecaster that was 
responsible for issuing that advisory. Noting a relationship within such a crude approximation of 
the outcome could indicate a possible association that may require further investigation. 
As well, I consider that there should also be considerations of the direction of change or 
consistency of the wind-speeds at advisory and impact. For instance, if a tropical storm was 
advised, did it really make landfall/approach, and if so, was it as a tropical storm, or a hurricane, 
or worse major hurricane? Likewise, if a hurricane was advised, did it land as a hurricane, or major 
hurricane, or did it land as a tropical storm? This is important to consider since an advisory which 
suggests preparation for a minor storm would have a different effect on agency and citizen 
preparedness compared to an advisory for a major storm. As such, I create a categorical measure 
to indicate the consistency levels of the advisories, denoted as follows: 
 Level 0, if the advisory of the storm type was consistent with the wind-speed at impact; 
 Level 1, if the advisory of the storm type was more intense than the wind-speed at impact, e.g. 
regardless of the advisory type, the storm didn’t make approach/landfall, or the advisory was 
for a hurricane watch or warning and the intensity at impact was either a tropical depression or 
a tropical storm;  
 Level 2, if the advisory of the storm type was less intense than the wind-speed at impact, e.g. 
the advisory issued was for a tropical storm watch or warning and the intensity at impact was 
at hurricane-force winds of category 1 or 2;  
 Level 3, if the advisory of the storm type was much less intense than the wind-speed at impact, 
e.g. the advisory issued was for a tropical storm watch or warning and the intensity at impact 
was at hurricane-force winds of category 3, 4, or 5. 
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3.3.5. Other Relevant Data 
 
There were a few other pieces of information I collated for this research paper. Firstly, 
using the storm advisory dataset as well as the data on the landfall or approach of a storm to a 
country, I calculated the time difference, in hours, between advisory and impact. Also, I isolated 
the day of the week that each advisory was issued. Since these are noted in UTC, I first adjusted 
each advisory date to the local time at issuance (noting daylight savings time adjustment where 
necessary), and then coded the days of the week with 1 for Monday to 7 for Sunday.  
As well, I calculated whether a storm went through a period of Rapid Intensification, 
defined by the NHC as an increase in the maximum sustained winds of a tropical cyclone of at 
least 30 knots in a 24-hour period. Storm data were collected from the HURDAT2 dataset33 and 
the wind-speed intensity of storms was analyzed at synoptic times (00, 06, 12, 18 GMT). I denoted 
each storm which had at least one period of 24 hours of rapid intensification with a binary code of 
1, to utilize this as a proxy for unpredictability.  
Lastly, I included annual information on the Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE) for that 
year. ACE is a measure used by various agencies including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and the India Meteorological Department to express the activity of 
individual tropical cyclones and entire tropical cyclone seasons. 
3.4 Research Design and Method 
 
It is known here that an NHC official forecast reflects the consideration of all available 
model guidance as well as forecaster experience. Given the identity of the forecasters in each of 
                                                                
33 HURDAT2 is a text format dataset with six-hourly information on the location, maximum winds, central pressure, and 
(beginning in 2004) size of all known tropical cyclones and subtropical cyclones (see https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/#hurdat). 
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the NHC tropical cyclone forecasts/advisories, it is possible to associate these names with the 
outcomes of whether the advisory of the storm type was consistent with the wind-speed at impact. 
Firstly, based on my research and understanding of the development and issuance of storm 
advisories by the NHC, I make the assumption that all forecasters would have access to and utilize 
the same/similar models, science and technology, and that they are randomly assigned to producing 
and issuing a forecast advisory for the relevant storm underway. It is likely, then, that the 
assignment of forecasters to produce a storm advisory is exogenous as it is determined by random 
factors not associated with the type or nature of the storm, or possible affected country, or time of 
day and year. As well, it is important to note that storms develop naturally, regardless of the 
forecaster on duty. 
Based on the natural and random variations in the available data, I am able to utilize a 
natural experiment structure to analyze whether human-specific characteristics of the lead 
forecaster may play a role in the accuracy or consistency outcome of an advisory. This may be a 
plausible identification strategy to understand the relationship between forecasters and advisory 
outcomes since the variables of interest are influenced by nature rather than some artificial 
manipulation, and the counter-factual data of whether different forecasters might offer different 
outcomes for the same storm advisory cannot be available. Given this “random” nature of the 
included variables, the observed outcomes of a natural experiment offers some belief in a causal 
relationship, although it is noted that it may not unequivocally prove causation. 
As such, as forecasters all have access to similar data and technology, I expect that some 
forecasters may influence consistent outcomes more than others since personal characteristics may 
be related to advisory outcomes. I also expect that these characteristics may possibly be further 
affected by other parameters, for example, the day of the week, the busyness of the hurricane 
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season that year, and the general predictability of the storm. As such, other potential predictor 
variables could include: the day of the week each advisory was made, a measure of the activity of 
the hurricane season in the particular year (using the Accumulated Cyclone Energy indicator), and 
whether or not the storm rapidly intensified during its life cycle (as a proxy for unpredictability).  
As described in Section 3.3.4, I define and calculate the outcome variable for consistency 
of a storm advisory by comparing the type of storm intensity within the advisory (as highlighted 
in Section 3.3.1), and at impact, by considering whether the storm made landfall or made a close 
approach to the island (as outlined in Section 3.3.3). In the first instance, I denote this comparison 
in simple binary form: if the advisory of the storm type was consistent with the storm wind-speed 
at impact, it is indicated by 1, or 0 if not. I utilize simple linear regression analysis to consider the 
effects of the main forecaster issuing the advisory, as shown in the specification in Equation 1. 
Since the dependent variable (“Consistency Outcome”) for each observation in Equation 1 is a 
binary outcome variable, either 1 or 0, this is categorized as a linear probability model, which is a 
special case of a binomial regression model and which works like a normal linear regression model, 
but the interpretations change because now the dependent variable is binary. Here, in general, 
given the independent variable, the predicted outcome value is the predicted probability that the 
dependent variable equals one. The associated coefficient for each individual forecaster is the 
change in the probability that the outcome of the advisory is ‘consistent’ for a one-unit change of 
the independent variable of interest, holding everything else constant. As such, in the basic 
estimation model, I can understand the association between the forecaster issuing the advisory and 
the consistency outcome, including relevant controls (𝛾𝑖) for the year and country fixed effects. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡             … Eq. 1 
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One usual problem with linear probability models is that it can predict probabilities outside 
0 and 1. However, since the independent regressor variables are dummy variables indicating each 
forecaster, the average probability of a consistent outcome from each forecaster is bounded 
between 0 and 1, and so this model will predict probabilities bounded between 0 and 1. I note that 
other studies which include a binary outcome variable may consider a logit or a probit model, 
which is based on the standard logistic distribution and standard Normal distribution, respectively. 
However, since initial results between these three models are comparable (see Table 3-3), and 
linear probability models and the interpretation of their results are generally simpler and easier to 
understand, I use these throughout the first part of the analysis.  
I further build on this model by including a variety of control and predictor variables.  A 
main control variable to be considered would be the time difference between each advisory and 
the time of impact of the storm. Including this variable could assist in better comparing the 
advisory consistency of each forecaster based on the advance of the time of impact, since 
advisories issued closer to impact could likely be more consistent than those issued further in 
advance, noting storm dynamics.  
Although I start with the definition of a simple binary outcome variable to see if there could 
be any relationship between the consistency outcome and the lead person responsible for making 
the advisory, I do understand there may be concerns regarding this limited approach in defining 
the outcome. While I do appreciate the value of the initial simple approach, and results which 
appear using such coarse data may highlight associations which should be properly considered, I 
also include within this paper an alternative methodology to complement these results. I then 
consider a categorical outcome variable which indicates the consistency levels of the advisories 
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(as defined in Section 3.3.4), and will use both an Ordered and Multinomial logit model to better 
understand how forecasters may affect the levels of negative advisory influence.  
For this categorical outcome variable, the categories of the outcome response can be 
considered as ordinal dependent variables, in that the responses follow some sort of rank level – 
level 0 indicates a consistency between the advisory of the storm type and the wind-speed at 
impact, whereas levels 1 through 3 denote increasingly severe outcomes. An ordered logistic 
regression model is an extension of the logistic regression and used for such ordinal dependent 
variables based on these level differences. Running a Multinomial logistic regression would be 
similar to doing an ordered logistic regression, although it is now assumed that there is no order to 
the categories of the outcome variable. While the information contained in the ordering is lost with 
the multinomial logistic regression, it does offer some sense of prediction, which is not offered 
with the ordered logistic model. My main predictor variable in these regressions is the number of 
years of experience of the lead forecaster, a detail of the forecasters which may enable me to better 
understand how people may affect consistent advisory outcomes. 
Before considering the models and results for either the binary and categorical outcome 
variables, I first consider the specific aspects of the forecaster data. This is since a concern about 
the available data of the advising forecasters (see Table 3-1) may be about the difference in the 
number of advisories that each forecaster makes over the period of study. This could have the 
effect that forecasters who make more advisories might have a different consistency of outcome 
compared to those who make less advisories. To understand this, I use the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
to understand whether the outcome of consistent advisories differed based on the lead forecaster 
making the advisory, and how many advisories they issued.  
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The Kruskal-Wallis H test is a rank-based nonparametric test that can be used to determine 
if there are statistically significant differences between two or more groups of an independent 
variable on a continuous or ordinal dependent variable. Firstly, I confirm that the assumptions that 
underpin the Kruskal-Wallis H test have been met: the dependent outcome variable is binary and 
thus can be considered as ordinal; as individual forecasters, the independent variable consists of 
two or more categorical, independent (unrelated) groups; there is independence of observations, 
as there is no relationship between the observations in each group or between the groups 
themselves; and since the distribution of observations for each group of the independent variable 
differs, the corresponding interpretation of results would need to be considered in terms of 
differences in mean ranks. Since it is noted that some of the forecasters make the same number of 
observations and are thus of similar rank, the chi-squared with ties value will be considered and 
its associated probability value compared to the 95% significance level to assess the null 
hypothesis that the population means are all equal. 
The results for the Kruskal-Wallis H test will precede the regression analyses considering 
both the binary and categorical outcome variables. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1. The Effect of the Advising Forecaster on Consistent Outcomes 
 
As described in the Research Design and Method, I first consider a Kruskal-Wallis H test 
to determine if forecast consistency outcomes were different for the 22 forecasters, since each 
forecaster has done varying amounts of observations over the period of analysis. In doing this test, 
and considering the p-value of the chi-squared with ties estimate, the results show that there is a 
statistically significant difference in consistency outcomes across the 22 forecasters [χ2(21) = 
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50.925, p = 0.0003]. This highlights that despite the varying numbers of advisories issued by 
forecasters, there is a difference of consistency outcomes by forecaster.   
It is important to note that the Kruskal-Wallis H test is an omnibus test statistic, i.e. 
designed to detect any of a broad range of departures from a specific null hypothesis. It cannot 
offer information on which specific groups of the independent variable are statistically 
significantly different from each other – it only offers that at least the groups were different. Since 
there are 22 forecasters in this study design, and it is of interest to understand if and how these 
individuals differ from each other in their forecast consistency, regression analysis will be done. 
As outlined in the research design, to better understand the differences in advisory 
consistency by forecaster, I first consider a linear probability model considering the influence of 
each of the 22 forecasters on the binary advisory outcome Here, as defined in Section 3.3.4, this 
outcome takes on the value of 1 if the advisory is consistent, i.e. if the advisory of the storm type 
was consistent with the wind-speed at impact, and 0 otherwise. I again note a few assumptions 
regarding the advisories made by the forecasters: that each forecaster is randomly assigned to a 
work schedule and as well would be randomly assigned to create advisories for a particular storm 
for a particular country. As well, I make the assumption that all forecasters have access to the same 
data, models, and techniques, and so unique characteristics about each forecaster may play a role 
in interpreting storm information and issuing advisories.  
Based on the research design, assumptions made, and the specifications outlined before, 
there seems to be a difference of influence of forecaster on the outcome of a consistent advisory – 
some forecasters seem to have a positive influence, while others a negative influence.  
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The variety of influence by forecaster on the probability of a consistent advisory is 
illustrated in Figure 3-3, a coefficient plot of the basic model including country and year fixed 
effects, using Forecaster 21, the forecaster with the median number of issued advisories, as a 
baseline. The coefficients listed refer to the change in the probability that the outcome of the 
advisory is ‘consistent’ based on the efforts of each forecaster, within a 95% confidence interval. 
To add context to these results, I also consider an F-test of the overall significance of the model, 
by comparing a model with no predictors (i.e. an intercept-only model) to the model specified 
above. Such an F-test assesses multiple coefficients simultaneously, and the results confirm that 
the entire model is statistically significant, and the forecaster dummies are jointly not all equal to 
zero [F (21, 2368) = 2.10, Prob. > F = 0.0024]. 
The variety of influence described above also holds when an indication of the time 
difference between the issuance of the advisory and the time of impact is included as a control, as 
shown in Figure 3-4. However, in this latter model, Forecasters 6, 9, and 18 are the only forecasters 
which have a positive change in the probability that a forecaster issues an advisory which has a 
consistent outcome, relative to Forecaster 21 and holding everything else constant. 
For comparison, if I consider a different baseline, I note that the results are generally similar 
in terms of the varying levels of influence of the forecasters on the binary outcome of consistency. 
Figure 3-5 shows the coefficient plot of the basic model including country and year fixed effects, 
using Forecaster 8, the forecaster who issued the most number of advisories for the selected group 
of countries in the period under consideration, within a 95% confidence interval, which could be 
compared to Figure 3-7 which shows a parallel using a baseline of Forecaster 11, the person who 
issued the least number of advisories. As shown, while there is much variation in the change in the 
probability that the outcome of the advisory is ‘consistent’ based on the efforts of each forecaster 
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within both plots, the coefficients are all positive in the plot of the baseline of Forecaster 11, the 
person who issued the fewest advisories. While the probabilities are lower when compared to the 
person who issued the most forecasts, Forecasters 9 and 18 seem to continuously show the highest 
probability of making a consistent outcome compared to the other forecasters, while Forecasters 2 
and 14 with the lowest probability of doing so. Similar results are found when considering a model 
which also includes a control for the time difference between the time the storm advisory was 
made and the likely impact of the storm, as shown in the coefficient plots in Figure 3-6 and Figure 
3-8. 
3.5.2. The Effect of Forecaster Experience on Consistent Outcome Levels 
 
In the previous section, I aim to test whether there is a difference of influence of forecaster 
on the binary outcome of a successful advisory, where 1 denoted if the advisory of the storm type 
was consistent with the wind-speed at impact, and 0 otherwise. Based on the results, I do note that 
some forecasters seem to have a higher probability of having a positive influence on the 
consistency outcome, while others a lower probability. Noting these interesting results based on 
models which use a binary outcome variable, and aware of the limitations of focusing on a 
consistency outcome which is binary, I also look at a levels-based or categorical outcome variable.  
As defined in Section 3.3.4, I consider the following categories of consistency outcome:  
Level 0:  advisory of the storm type was consistent with the wind-speed at impact;  
Level 1:  advisory of the storm type was more intense than wind-speed at impact;  
Level 2:  advisory of the storm type was less intense than wind-speed at impact (e.g., tropical 
storm force winds advised, but minor hurricane level at impact);  
Level 3: advisory of the storm type was much less intense than wind-speed at impact (e.g., 
tropical storm force winds advised, but major hurricane level at impact). 
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As done in the previous section, I first consider the results of the Kruskal-Wallis H test to 
determine if forecast consistency level-based outcomes were different for the 22 forecasters (each 
with varying amounts of observations). In reviewing the p-value of the chi-squared with ties, there 
was a statistically significant difference in level-based consistency outcomes across the 22 
forecasters [χ2(21) = 51.682, p = 0.0002]. As before, this highlights that when considering 
categorical outcomes, and despite the varying numbers of advisories issued by forecasters, there 
is yet a difference of consistency outcomes by forecaster.   
To see if this result may be affected by sample size, I also repeat this test without the 
forecasters who made less than 20 advisories for these countries within this time period. Since 
there were no forecasters who made the same number of advisories within this group of 15 
forecasters, I consider the p-value of the chi-squared result without ties, which showed that there 
was a statistically significant difference in level-based consistency outcomes across the 22 
forecasters [χ2(14) = 48.301, p = 0.0001].  
In this model, to better understand how forecasters may affect the levels of consistency 
inconsistency, I consider a predictor variable of the years of experience for forecasters, for which 
I have data for 15 out of 22 forecasters. For this categorical outcome variable, in which the 
categories of the outcome response are considered as ordinal dependent variables, in that the 
responses follow some sort of rank level, I first run an ordered logistic regression model which 
would offer information on how forecasters’ experience influences the inconsistency of the 
outcome. As shown in Table 3-4, in Column 1, it is noted that for a one year of increase in 
forecaster experience, there is an expected 0.015 decrease in the log odds of having an inconsistent 
accuracy outcome, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant. That is to say, in 
this model, forecasters with more experience perhaps tend to be more consistent between the 
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advisory and impact outcomes. However, when controls for the time difference between the 
advisory and impact (in hours), linear time trend, as well as forecaster and country fixed effects 
are included, as shown in Column 8, the results show that for a one year increase in forecaster 
experience, there is now an expected statistically significant 0.389 increase in the log odds of 
making an inconsistent advisory outcome, all else held constant.  
I also use a multinomial logit model to test the effect of experience on the advisory 
inconsistency outcome levels, since this model assists with prediction. Table 3-5 shows the results 
of this regression: Columns 1-3 depicts the results for Model 1, which only includes forecaster 
experience as the predictor variable, Columns 4-6 depicts that for Model 2, which now includes a 
control for the forecast time difference, and Columns 7-9 further include a linear time trend in 
Model 3. Looking at Model 1, it is noted that if a forecaster had one more year of experience, there 
would be a statistically significant 0.024 decrease in the multinomial log odds of him making a 
level 1 inconsistent outcome over a consistent outcome. However, for the same Model 1, for an 
additional year of experience, there would be a statistically significant 0.028 increase in the 
multinomial log odds of him making a level 3 inconsistent outcome over a consistent outcome. 
Due to the year-to-year improvement in model technology, forecasts may generally get better over 
time. As such, to better understand the influence of forecaster experience on these level-based 
advisory outcomes, I also include a linear time trend. The signs of the parameter estimates hold 
when including this, in addition to forecast time difference (in years), as in Model 3, as well as 
when including forecaster fixed effects (see Table 3-6).  
3.6 Discussion 
 
The ongoing study, review, and updating of the scientific inputs and storm forecast models 
is an essential part of the work done by NOAAA/NHC to “lead to improved public response, 
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including savings of life and property” (HFIP, 2018). In addition to this, since each storm analysis 
is different and requires active human judgment, the forecasters themselves may likely be essential 
elements of the forecasting process. The findings of this paper show this to be generally true.  
This paper uses regression analysis to better understand the role of humans in making 
consistent advisory outcomes, as defined either in binary or categorical terms based on the 
comparison of indication of storm intensity in the advisory to the storm intensity at landfall or 
close approach to a country/territory. When looking at the binary indicator of consistent outcomes, 
the results show that there is indeed variation in the change in the probability that the outcome of 
the advisory is ‘consistent’ based on the efforts of each forecaster – some forecasters seem to have 
a positive influence on consistency outcomes, while others a negative influence, often with some 
general pattern. In focusing on a levels-based categorical outcome, such as that for which level 0 
indicates that the intensity at advisory and landfall is consistent, to level 3 when the advisory issued 
indicates a much less intense storm than what actualizes at landfall, forecaster experience, as an 
indication of human characteristic, seems to play a role in type of inconsistent advisories issued. 
While Forecasters with more experience may be less associated with low-level errors, they perhaps 
may be associated with high-level errors.  
While the NHC strives to improve models and forecasts over time, this research highlights 
the role of people – forecasters – and the critical role they may play in utilizing available climate 
information towards outcome consistency. Although there has been much investment in the data 
and models of storm forecasting, and it is likely that there is corresponding action to improve the 
capability and capacity of hurricane specialists, the level and detail of such complementarity is not 
known. A general encouragement of the further need for investing in human capital at the NHC 
could then be a helpful step towards improved advisories. 
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Further, as this paper doesn’t venture into the mechanisms of these associations, it may be 
helpful to better understand the possible reasons for forecaster-related variations among outcomes. 
In particular, the result that forecaster experience could be associated more with high-level 
inconsistency outcomes is concerning. This could perhaps be tied to the dynamic nature of storms 
and their rapid intensification over time, or, at some level, the possibility that some senior 
forecasters are less cautious than expected, due to having more storms to forecast given certain 
conditions, or even administrative challenges of having more to do, as is the case for senior staff. 
Further study and analysis to better understand this could be beneficial both to the advisory 
outcomes, but as well to countries which prepare for storms based on these advisories. 
In this regard, in addition to a potential benefit of improving the interaction between 
forecasters, the ongoing dialogue between forecasters and the local meteorological agencies and 
country offices they interact with in monitoring and issuing forecasts should also be bolstered. 
This could help ensure that determination of storm development and advisories concerning storm 
intensity could be done with more efficiency and sensitivity to local conditions.  
Improved storm advisories assist Caribbean countries in the preparedness strategies 
undertaken during the hurricane season. Given the nature of storms in the Caribbean, and their 
economic and social impact, as well as the resource availability resident within these small states, 
preparing for storms is usually a frequent and costly process. As well, preparing for a lower level 
tropical storm is quite often a different process compared to preparing for a major hurricane. 
Inconsistent or inaccurate advisories, whether in terms of location or storm intensity, can hinder 
the effective utilization of scarce financial, infrastructural and human resources. Updated 
advisories noting, if not addressing, these concerns could be a helpful step in improving the 
preparedness of Caribbean small islands to tropical storms. 
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Since this research highlights the availability of data relating to a coarse indication of rapid 
intensification of storms and the day of the week of the storm advisory as well as storm impact,  
perhaps a next step for this research could be to include these variables in subsequent analysis. 
Preliminary analysis highlights that rapidly intensifying storms may generally have a negative 
influence on consistency outcomes, as expected, and that some forecasters may especially issue 
more inaccurate advisories. Such a finding connecting forecasters and rapidly intensifying storms 
could offer some idea of the nature of this escalating challenge, and how even seasoned experts 
may respond differently. As such, a better understanding of the nature and frequency of rapidly 
intensifying storms is needed, alongside the precautions and techniques that forecasters should use 
when making advisories. As well, early work suggests that forecasts issued on the weekends, 
especially Sundays, may be negatively associated with consistent outcomes. The signal of different 
days of the week on consistent outcomes may offer some insights of the need for focus on the 
timing of communication, the challenge of weekends, and the need to foster further forecaster 
interaction, amongst themselves but also with country member states.  
Noting the frequency of storms in the region, a subsequent research area could focus on 
whether the recency of events, such as the recall of information from previous storm advisories, 
or the domination of attention a massive event, or other cognitive biases, may play a role on 
forecasters’ abilities to make consistent advisories. Such further work could enhance the general 
intention of this paper to understand the role of human actions on consistent advisories, or, whether 
some forecasters may be better than others. Lastly, considering the challenge of storms in the 
Caribbean, in general, this paper could be also adapted to consider if there may be any general 
insights from connecting the role of forecasters, and disaster impacts, such as people affected by 
storms and storm damages, and/or wider macroeconomic outcomes at the national level.   
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3.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3-1: Tropical Cyclone Basins and Responsible Monitoring and Forecasting Agency 
 
Source: http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/F1.html   
 
Figure 3-2: Example of a Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisory 
 
Source: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/al05/al052015.fstadv.008.shtml? 
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Table 3-1: Summary of Advisories made by Forecasters, 1998-2015 
 
Note: Table shows Forecasters’ activity over the period 1998-2015, with the total number of advisories issued within 
this period shown on the right. The mean number of advisories issued is 110 and the median number of 
advisories issued is 43.5 (corresponding to Forecaster 21). Forecaster 11 issued the least number of 
advisories, and Forecaster 8 issued the most. The mean number of years of activity is 6.45.  
 
 
Table 3-2: Summary Statistics 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consistent Advisory 2524 0.5515055 0.4974387 0 1 
Consistent Advisory 
Outcome Levels 
2524 0.590729      0.764404           0 3 
Forecaster 2420 10.94669     4.717577           1 22 
Year 2712 2006.257     4.877865        1998 2015 
Country 2524 6.222662     3.675117           1 14 
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Table 3-3: Comparing Regression Models 
Dep. Variable:  
Successful Advisory 
(1) (2) (3) 
LPM Logit Probit 
    
1.Forecaster 0.172 0.731 0.452 
 (0.147) (0.664) (0.405) 
2.Forecaster -0.277*** -1.215** -0.746*** 
 (0.100) (0.476) (0.287) 
3.Forecaster 0.147 0.613 0.381 
 (0.173) (0.762) (0.467) 
4.Forecaster 0.0586 0.237 0.148 
 (0.0824) (0.331) (0.207) 
5.Forecaster 0.178* 0.760* 0.470* 
 (0.0917) (0.394) (0.243) 
6.Forecaster 0.0356 0.143 0.0896 
 (0.181) (0.728) (0.455) 
7.Forecaster 0.0274 0.110 0.0689 
 (0.0762) (0.304) (0.190) 
8.Forecaster 0.0935 0.382 0.238 
 (0.0746) (0.299) (0.187) 
9.Forecaster 0.230 1.019 0.624 
 (0.169) (0.864) (0.513) 
10.Forecaster 0.0806 0.328 0.205 
 (0.0759) (0.304) (0.190) 
11.Forecaster -0.187 -0.773 -0.481 
 (0.282) (1.257) (0.769) 
12.Forecaster 0.112 0.463 0.288 
 (0.0839) (0.342) (0.213) 
13.Forecaster 0.147* 0.613* 0.381* 
 (0.0863) (0.359) (0.223) 
14.Forecaster 0.00941 0.0377 0.0236 
 (0.141) (0.562) (0.352) 
15.Forecaster 0.0215 0.0865 0.0542 
 (0.0759) (0.303) (0.190) 
16.Forecaster -0.0635 -0.254 -0.159 
 (0.0800) (0.319) (0.200) 
17.Forecaster -0.00485 -0.0194 -0.0122 
 (0.113) (0.449) (0.281) 
18.Forecaster 0.194* 0.836* 0.516* 
 (0.105) (0.469) (0.286) 
19.Forecaster -0.00276 -0.0110 -0.00692 
 (0.117) (0.467) (0.293) 
20.Forecaster 0.0864 0.352 0.220 
 (0.0872) (0.353) (0.221) 
22.Forecaster 0.194 0.836 0.516 
 (0.141) (0.656) (0.397) 
Constant 0.520*** 0.0800 0.0502 
 (0.0710) (0.283) (0.177) 
Observations 2,420 2,420 2,420 
R-squared 0.021   
Year FE No No No 
Country FE No No No 
 
This table compares and highlights the similarities of the results of a linear probability model (LPM) with logit and 
probit, for a model testing the influence of a forecaster on a successful advisory outcome, without controls for year 
and country.  All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 3-3: Coefficient Plot of Forecasters on Binary Consistent Advisory Outcome, baseline of 
Forecaster 21 (median), with year & country controls 
 
 
This plot of the coefficients of the linear probability model (LPM) of the forecaster on the binary consistent advisory 
outcome, with controls for year and country affected, orders the forecasters by the point estimates from most to least 
consistent, within a 95% confidence interval. It uses a baseline of Forecaster 21, the forecaster who issued the 
median number of advisories. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Coefficient Plot of Forecasters on Binary Consistent Advisory Outcome, baseline of 
Forecaster 21 (median), with time difference, year & country controls 
 
 
This plot of the coefficients of the LPM of forecaster on the binary consistent advisory outcome, with controls for 
year and country affected, as well as the time difference between forecast and impact, orders the forecasters by the 
point estimates from most to least consistent, within a 95% confidence interval. It uses a baseline of Forecaster 21, 
the forecaster who issued median number of advisories. 
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Figure 3-5: Coefficient Plot of Forecasters on Binary Consistent Advisory Outcome, baseline of 
Forecaster 8 (most number of advisories), with year & country controls 
 
 
This plot of the coefficients of the LPM of forecaster on the binary consistent advisory outcome, with controls for 
year and country affected, orders the forecasters by the point estimates from most to least consistent, within a 95% 
confidence interval. It uses a baseline of Forecaster 8, the forecaster who issued the most number of advisories. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Coefficient Plot of Forecasters on Binary Consistent Advisory Outcome, baseline of 
Forecaster 8 (most number of advisories), with time difference, year & country 
controls 
 
 
This plot of the coefficients of the LPM of forecaster on the binary consistent advisory outcome, with controls for 
year and country affected, as well as the time difference between forecast and impact, orders the forecasters by the 
point estimates from most to least consistent, within a 95% confidence interval. It uses a baseline of Forecaster 8, 
the forecaster who issued the most number of advisories. 
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Figure 3-7: Coefficient Plot of Forecasters on Binary Consistent Advisory Outcome, baseline of 
Forecaster 11 (least number of advisories), with year & country controls 
 
 
This plot of the coefficients of the LPM of forecaster on the binary consistent advisory outcome, with controls for 
year and country affected, orders the forecasters by the point estimates from most to least consistent, within a 95% 
confidence interval. It uses a baseline of Forecaster 11, the forecaster who issued the least number of advisories. 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Coefficient Plot of Forecasters on Binary Consistent Advisory Outcome, baseline of 
Forecaster 11 (least number of advisories), with time difference, year & country 
controls 
 
 
This plot of the coefficients of the LPM of forecaster on the binary consistent advisory outcome, with controls for 
year and country affected, as well as the time difference between forecast and impact, orders the forecasters by the 
point estimates from most to least consistent, within a 95% confidence interval. It uses a baseline of Forecaster 11, 
the forecaster who issued the least number of advisories. 
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Table 3-4: Summary Results of Ordered Logistic regression predicting Consistent Outcome 
Levels 
Dep. Variable:  
Advisory 
Outcome Levels 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        
         
Forecaster Exp. 
(yrs.) 
-0.0153** -0.0109 -0.0183** -0.0186 -0.0181* 0.359** -0.0160* 0.389** 
 (0.00616) (0.00961) (0.00853) (0.0132) (0.00933) (0.181) (0.00945) (0.183) 
         
Fct Time Diff. 
(hrs.) 
  0.00380 0.00324 0.00379 0.00324 0.00339 0.00269 
   (0.00268) (0.00276) (0.00268) (0.00276) (0.00270) (0.00276) 
Year     -0.000838 -0.378** 0.00544 -0.401** 
     (0.0121) (0.180) (0.0129) (0.183) 
         
Constant cut1 0.107 -1.145*** 1.050*** -0.404 -0.629 -756.3** 12.03 -803.1** 
 (0.0833) (0.285) (0.123) (0.406) (24.21) (361.4) (25.88) (366.7) 
Constant cut2 2.227*** 1.007*** 1.929*** 0.493 0.250 -755.4** 12.92 -802.2** 
 (0.0995) (0.280) (0.127) (0.401) (24.19) (361.4) (25.86) (366.7) 
Constant cut3 3.400*** 2.188*** 3.125*** 1.706*** 1.446 -754.2** 14.12 -800.9** 
 (0.141) (0.284) (0.156) (0.391) (24.22) (361.4) (25.89) (366.7) 
         
Observations 2,208 2,208 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 
Country FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Forecaster FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Table compares the results of a various ordered logistic models testing the influence of forecaster experience (in years) 
on a levels-based consistent advisory outcome. Even-numbered columns include forecaster fixed effects (FE). 
Columns 3-8 include a control for the forecast time difference (in hours), while columns 5-8 also include a linear time 
trend. Columns 7 and 8 include country FE. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance 
levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-5: Results of Multinomial Logistic regression predicting Consistent Outcome Levels 
Dep. Variable:  
Advisory 
Outcome Levels 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 vs. 0 2 vs. 0 3 vs. 0 1 vs. 0 2 vs. 0 3 vs. 0 1 vs. 0 2 vs. 0 3 vs. 0 
          
Forecaster Exp. 
(years) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
-0.044*** 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
-0.027** 
(0.012) 
-0.040*** 
(0.014) 
0.041** 
(0.021) 
          
Forecast Time 
Diff. (hours) 
   
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
          
Year       -0.068*** 
(0.016) 
0.103*** 
(0.022) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
          
Constant 
-0.223*** 
(0.093) 
-2.146*** 
(0.191) 
-3.414*** 
(0.252) 
-1.405*** 
(0.152) 
-2.148*** 
(0.210) 
-3.611*** 
(0.281) 
134.33*** 
(32.920) 
-209.06*** 
(45.097) 
64.356*** 
(41.703) 
          
 
Table highlights the results of the multinomial logistic model concerning forecaster experience (in years) on the 
categorical level-based consistent advisory outcome. N =  2208 for Model 1, and 1641 for Models 2 and 3. Baseline 
category is Level 0, referring to consistency between advisory and impact wind-speed); Level 1 is categorized if the 
wind-speed in advisory was more than at impact, Level 2 is if the wind-speed in advisory was less than at impact, 
and Level 3 is if the wind-speed in advisory was much less than at impact. The table shows the results of three 
models: Model 1 includes forecaster experience only, Model 2 includes forecast experience as well as the forecast 
time difference (in hours) as a control, and Model 3 includes forecast time different and a linear time trend (Year) as 
additional controls. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 3-6: Results of Multinomial Logistic regression Model 1, incl. Forecaster FE 
Dep. Variable:  
Advisory Outcome Levels 
Model 1  
(1) (2) (3) 
1 vs. 0 2 vs. 0 3 vs. 0 
    
Forecaster Exp. (years) -0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.055** 
(0.024) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
    
Constant 
.947** 
(0.414) 
-0.349 
(0.500) 
-16.19*** 
(0.321) 
    
 
Table highlights the results of Model 1 from Table 3-5, now including forecaster fixed effects. All columns show 
robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Chapter 4. Understanding the Nature of Storm Lead Times in 
the Caribbean 
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Abstract 
Tropical cyclones have historically wreaked havoc on Caribbean islands, affecting millions 
of persons, costing billions in economic damages, and disrupting the development process in 
inherently vulnerable states. As the region is poised to build back better following recent events, 
and there are much-needed ongoing global efforts to better understand and forecast the track, 
strength and intensity of storms, it is timely to consider the nature of how storms have affected 
islands. Specifically, what do we know about storm lead times in the region? That is, how much 
time is there really before a storm makes an approach? Do we know if there is sufficient time to 
prepare for impact? Does this differ by storm strength (i.e. do stronger storms have a longer lead 
time?) or by country? Further to this, do longer lead times mean less disaster impacts? Few studies 
seem to explore storm-related climate information in this context, although such an analysis could 
offer important insights for early warning, disaster preparedness, comprehensive disaster risk 
management and resilience strategies.  
This research offers insights into these questions by analyzing storm lead time data (the 
difference in time from the first advisory to approach), disaster and economic data for 14 Caribbean 
countries over the period 1995-2015. For instance, it showcases that there may be relatively short 
lead times for storms in the Caribbean, and that some countries may be more affected by shorter 
lead times than others. This poses obvious concerns of the ability to adequately prepare, and 
highlights a specific challenge if a storm forecast is done over the weekend, due to gaps in 
communication and the cultural influence of information-sharing in the Caribbean. As well, this 
research offers insights into how lead times may relate to storm strength and storm damage, and 
can help minimize problems related to causation in economic analyses by offering identification 
of plausible tests to better understand the socio-economic impacts of storm disasters. Collaborating 
 
 
103 
with regional and local partners on the awareness of such findings and the potential of using 
climate information in this context may be a critical step towards improving the communication 
of risk and building disaster resilience within the Caribbean. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In 2017, two tropical cyclones, Hurricanes Irma and Maria, impacted 18 Caribbean 
countries and territories, affecting a combined 11 million persons and causing an estimated 
US$93.4 billion in economic damages (EM-DAT, 2019). As severely intense and strong 
hurricanes, of that year and on record, they inflicted catastrophic devastation on many of the 
Caribbean’s vulnerable Small Island developing states, so much so that many islands are still 
within the post-disaster recovery phase and reassessing development priorities. While the 
Caribbean is no stranger to tropical cyclones, disaster response efforts are indeed tested in times 
of large storms such as these. Importantly, events like these are a brutal reminder that disaster 
preparedness and resilience remain essential elements of the disaster management process and 
critical development tools, and efforts to better understand and adequately prepare for storms 
towards improving local resilience should be encouraged within the region. 
In general, research on tropical cyclones is expanding. There is ongoing scientific research 
development on understanding storm development, storm prediction, and forecast skill and 
performance, and efforts have been also made to better understand the relationship between storms 
and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon as well as climate change. Given the 
deadly and costly nature of tropical cyclones, inter-disciplinary research examining the causal 
effect of cyclones on development and economic growth, as well as the general understanding of 
natural hazard-based disasters on human life, is a pivotal area of study. However, research on the 
relative nature of disaster preparedness within the region and local needs to improve disaster 
resiliency has not been as forthcoming. There are yet unexplored ways in which climate 
information, natural hazard and vulnerability data could be best utilized to assess risk and assist 
preparedness and response. For instance, do we know how long countries may have to mobilize 
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efforts ahead of storm impact, or whether stronger storms are easier to predict? In the context of 
early warning, it may seem reasonable to expect that a longer lead time, i.e. the time interval 
between a storm forecast and landfall or close approach, may be beneficial for preparedness efforts, 
but there have been few studies, if any, exploring storm lead times. To provoke discussion, this 
paper reviews storm data for 14 Caribbean countries over 1995-2015 to offer information on the 
nature of storm lead times within the region, as well as insights on the relationship structure 
between storm lead times, storm strength, and storm damage.  
Firstly, I define and explore the nature of storm lead times and find that there are relatively 
short leads for storms in the Caribbean, affecting some countries more than others. Such 
knowledge can be helpful for Caribbean disaster managers, especially for those islands which 
don’t have national weather services. Moreover, as highlighted in Chapter 2, short lead times may 
prove a challenge if a storm forecast is done over the weekend, due to a breakdown of 
communication and the possible cultural influence on sharing information in the Caribbean. 
Secondly, I differentiate the storm lead times based on the natural cutoffs used for storm categories 
based on wind speed, to better understand the relationship between stronger storms and longer lead 
times. Lastly, I explore the relationship between storm lead time and disaster impacts, by utilizing 
EM-DAT (the International Disaster Database) data on people affected and economic damages. I 
generally find that longer lead times are positively related to higher disaster damages, but this may 
be confounded by the relationship between the sheer strength and impact of the storm.  
While more investigation on the various mechanisms is necessary, and despite a small 
sample size, such findings imply the need for increased focus on the timeliness of climate 
information, the role of localized awareness, preparedness and resilience, as well as the benefit of 
improved and appropriate risk communication to minimize disaster impact. 
 
 
106 
4.2 Background 
 
Defined as a “rotating, organized system of clouds and thunderstorms that originates over 
tropical or subtropical waters and has a closed low-level circulation” (NHC, 2018), tropical 
cyclones typically develop “between approximately 5° and 30° latitude and initially move 
westward (owing to easterly winds) and slightly towards the poles” (Met Office, 2018). There are 
seven basins of tropical cyclone formation – the north Atlantic Ocean, the eastern and western 
parts of the northern Pacific Ocean, the southwestern Pacific, the southwestern and 
southeastern Indian Oceans, and the northern Indian Ocean (Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal). 
While an estimated 80-100 tropical cyclones develop across the world each year (Met Office, 
2018), the northwestern Pacific basin is the most active region with an average of 26 tropical 
cyclones and 16.5 Hurricane/Typhoon/Severe Tropical Cyclones per year, followed by the 
northeastern/central Pacific region, then the north Atlantic (which includes the Caribbean region), 
based on available data for 1981-2010/2011 (HRD, 2017). This wide global and frequent 
occurrence of tropical cyclones, and their often deadly and costly impacts, has fostered the 
understanding of tropical cyclones in both scientific and socio-economic research domains.  
This paper summarily captures the wide-ranging research concerning the development of 
studies on as well as impact of tropical cyclones and other natural hazards. For instance, there is 
an extensive literature which looks at understanding storms and extreme weather (Emanuel, 1991; 
Corbosiero & Molinari, 2002; Smith, 2006; Kunkel et al., 2013), as well as the nature of rapid 
intensification of storms (Van Sang et al., 2008; Kaplan et al., 2010). The focus on storm 
predictability, warning and track forecasting has also increased over the years (Rappaport et al., 
2009; Goerss, 2000; Aberson, 2003), as well as improving the reliability and accuracy of storm 
forecasts and storm track models (Powell & Aberson, 2001; Rappaport et al., 2009; Vousdoukas 
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et al., 2012; NOAA, 2017). The literature also reviews factors which affect storm development, 
including ENSO and climate change (Camargo, Emanuel, & Sobel, 2007; Emanuel, 2017) due to 
the challenges of climate change and variability both on the development but also 
prediction/forecasting of storms. Given the importance of disaster impacts on property and human 
life, there has also been associated research on disaster impacts and the nature of disaster events 
relating to impacts, both specifically between tropical cyclones and local impacts/growth (Hsiang, 
2010; Hsiang & Jina, 2014; Shultz et al., 2005; Bakkensen & Mendelsohn, 2016; Bakkensen & 
Barragey, 2016; Martinez, 2018), and, more generally, between natural hazard-based disasters and 
macroeconomic outcomes (Anttila-Hughes & Hsiang, 2013; Benson & Clay, 2004; Hallegatte, 
2015; Guha-Sapir et al., 2017; Lopez et al., 2018).  
Research on the use of climate information in decision making as well as communicating 
hurricane risk has been growing in recent years. The Mesoscale and Microscale Meteorology 
(MMM) Laboratory of the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) has been 
particularly active in convening efforts relating to the intersection between weather hazards and 
society, although mostly focused on the US perspective. At a wider level, the ‘Weather Risks and 
Decisions in Society’ (WRaDS) program “builds fundamental understanding of how weather- and 
climate-related risks intersect with society, with an emphasis on how different types of information 
influence decision making and societal outcomes” (MMM, 2019). As well, the ‘Communicating 
Hazard Information in the Modern Environment’ (CHIME) project specifically looks at enhancing 
“resilience by improving hazardous weather risk communication and response in the modern 
information environment … [including] … building understanding of how evolving weather 
forecasts and warnings interact with societal information flow and decisions as a hurricane 
approaches and arrives” (MMM, 2019). The role of social media and social networking has also 
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been discussed in this avenue, and alongside the efforts of the MMM Lab, papers such as Enenkel 
et al. (2018) and Gray et al. (2019) have offered some perspectives of using and integrating climate 
and other socio-economic information more effectively through these mediums. 
Within this developing research field, there is still a limited discussion of the role of storm 
lead time, or the time interval between the forecast of a storm and its approach – one general paper 
by Regnier (2008) mentions lead times in the context of public evacuation decisions and hurricane 
track uncertainty. The focus on lead time has, however, been somewhat explored in the context of 
tornadoes (Brotzge & Erickson, 2009; Hoekstra et al., 2011; Simmons & Sutter, 2008; Bakkensen, 
2016), and to a much lesser extent in the context of flooding (Golding, 2009; Carsell et al., 2004). 
Despite the research advances and focus within in the global literature, the representative 
focus for the Caribbean context is still growing. At the broader level, there is a documentation of 
the context of a changing climate within and for Caribbean islands, for instance in Pulwarty, Nurse 
& Trotz (2010), as well as the chapters on Small Islands within various IPCC assessment reports 
(see Nurse et al., 2014). Hsiang (2010) has offered a wider Caribbean Basin view of the potential 
challenges of cyclones on economic production within the region, to which there has been some 
additional outlook (e.g. Strobl, 2012), and as well the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC) has specifically assessed and documented the ongoing 
impacts of disasters, particularly storms, within the Caribbean (e.g. see Bello et al., 2015). 
Insight on the role of climate information and its context within the challenges of risk 
communication in the region is underway. Dookie & Osgood (2018) offers a review of disaster 
management policy within the Caribbean, with a view of how climate information could be best 
situated within revamped disaster preparedness actions, while Dookie, Enenkel & Spence (2019) 
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identify the potential for using climate information as well as present a suite of climate information 
options for weather forecasting, preparedness, and communication efforts in the Jamaican context. 
Connecting climate information producers and users has been a salient concern of Guido et al. 
(2016), advocating for the encouragement of boundary organisations such as the Caribbean 
Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology in Barbados, and networks such as the Caribbean Climate 
Outlook Forums, in stimulating dialogue on the utility of climate information and how it should 
and could be best disseminated and used.  
Since there does not seem to be much definition and supporting evidence of the nature and 
variation of storm lead times, and how the timing of storm-based advisories and general climate 
information may affect communication and preparedness efforts, this paper plays a role in 
addressing this research gap in the context of the Caribbean perspective. 
4.3 Data 
 
An essential element of this paper is the sourcing and analysis of specific and underutilized 
data regarding storm lead times. Understanding lead times could only be possible though the 
compilation of storm advisory as well as storm approach data, in addition to the calculation of lead 
times for each storm event within the region. This process was arduous as it required both a web 
scrape and manual review of data to source this information, as described in Chapter 3.  
Data was primarily compiled for Caribbean countries affected by either tropical or 
convective storms within the region and for which there was readily available storm forecast 
advisories from the US National Hurricane Center (NHC). The focus on the particular 14 
Caribbean countries was based on the effect of disasters/role of preparedness in small island 
developing states within the region, as well as the availability of supplementary economic and 
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disaster impact data. The paper centers on data for 1995-2015 for 14 Caribbean countries: Antigua 
and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad 
and Tobago34.  
4.3.1. Calculating Storm Lead Times  
 
I define storm lead time as the interval, in hours, between the time of the first advisory 
issued for a particular storm for a particular country and the time of storm approach or landfall, as 
described below. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1, I gathered data on storm advisories through a 
laborious scraping of the NHC’s online archive of tropical cyclone forecasts/advisories. An 
advisory usually contains information regarding the date and time (UTC), the country/territory 
likely to be affected, the storm’s current latitude and longitude coordinates, intensity, and system 
motion, and the type of forecast advisory issued. The NHC offers four types of advisories – tropical 
storm watches and warnings, and hurricane watches and warnings: 
 A tropical storm is a cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind speed (using 
the U.S. 1-minute average) ranges from 34 knots (39 mph or 63 km/hr) to 63 knots (73 
mph or 118 km/hr).  
 A hurricane is a tropical cyclone in which the maximum sustained surface wind (using the 
U.S. 1-minute average) is 64 knots (74 mph or 119 km/hr) or more. 
 Watches indicate the possibility of an event within the specified area within 48 hours. 
                                                                
34 Other Caribbean countries, including Anguilla, Aruba, Cuba, and islands within the UK Territories, Netherlands Antilles, 
French West Indies, British and US Virgin Islands, were not included mainly due to the availability of a wide range of data. 
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 Warnings indicate the expectation of an event within the specified area within 36 hours. 
 
I focus on the first issued storm advisory for each island for each storm, as I use this as the 
first point of reference or alert of an impending threat to a country/territory.  
Next, as highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, I collated storm track data by utilizing information 
on the NOAA Office of Coastal Management website, Historical Hurricane Tracks. Without using 
improved software or programming, I focused on storms passing within 100-200 nautical miles 
from a country or territory to best understand whether the storm made landfall, or if it could have 
come close enough in approach to make some type of impact. This is since large storm systems 
have had effects on islands without making landfall (see Section 2.3.4), and I wanted to ensure 
that I was able to capture this information as comprehensively as possible. I visually looked at 
each storm track for each country and selected the HURDAT data point just as the storm was 
approaching the island (sometimes, the HURDAT data point that might be closer to the relevant 
island may be after the storm had already passed the island). For those storms that went on to make 
landfall, I do note that there could be differences in the wind-speed just before landfall and at 
landfall, and I would have selected the higher wind-speed and time, to reflect the potential 
maximum wind that the island may have faced. Storm strength at close approach/landfall would 
refer to the wind-speed of the storm either at landfall, or, if the storm didn’t make landfall, by 
looking at the closest proximity of the storm to the island.  
After accounting for local time zones and differences in daylight savings time, the collated 
advisory data was then tabulated against the storm track data to calculate the lead time in hours 
between each storm forecast and storm landfall or closest point of approach. The data was then 
checked for errors such as negative lead times and other discrepancies. 
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In speaking with Caribbean meteorological agencies about the storm advisory process 
within the region, it was revealed that there is a process of information transfer between the NHC 
and local government authorities and agencies, which may or may not be resident in the affected 
island, before such forecasts are made publicly available. It is noted that this process may delay or 
have other consequences on the transfer and real-time availability of forecast information. 
However, the date and time of the forecasts in this research reflects the timestamp of the official 
issuance of the first advisory of a particular storm for a particular island.  
4.3.2. Disaster Data  
 
Using the same dataset as in Chapter 2, this paper utilizes formally requested disaster 
impact data for the period 1995-2015 for the selected 14 Caribbean countries from the EM-DAT 
database, or CRED International Disaster Database, which is managed by the Université 
Catholique de Louvain in Brussels, Belgium. The database collates information for natural and 
technological hazards over the period 1900-present, and defines a disaster as a hazardous event 
which fits at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people dead; 100 or more people 
affected; declaration of a state of emergency; call for international assistance. It is again mentioned 
that there are likely inherent challenges to the availability and accuracy of disaster data, but there 
were few alternatives for the Caribbean-specific region of study. 
4.3.3. Economic Data  
 
As with Chapter 2, compiled economic data in this paper is sourced from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database, including the variables: annual gross domestic product, 
both current and at constant prices, expressed in aggregate as well as per capita terms; annual GDP 
growth; value of imports and exports of goods and services; and value of external debt. While 
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economic data is generally available for the Caribbean islands, a full dataset was not possible due 
to data limitations for Haiti.  
4.4 Research Design and Method 
 
The intention of this paper is to understand the nature and impacts of storm lead time within 
the Caribbean, given the sparse attention to it within the literature. Storm lead time is defined here 
as the interval, in hours, between the time of the first advisory issued for a particular storm for a 
particular country, and the time of storm approach or landfall. The grouping by storm approach or 
landfall is made since there were storms which came generally near an country and had some 
effect, but which did not make physical landfall (i.e. crossing of the country’s coastline) – some 
examples include 2001’s Hurricane Michelle in Jamaica and 2015’s Tropical Storm Erika in 
Dominica.  
A review and analysis of such information could offer insights into the differences in lead 
times across the region, and how this may affect, or be affected by, local preparedness processes. 
As well, when combined with information on storm strength and impact data, for instance, could 
offer important insights for early warning, disaster preparedness, comprehensive disaster risk 
management and resilience strategies. Currently, the use of storm-related data and climate 
information in this way is not largely present in local and regional planning, although it could 
provide countries a more appropriate and relevant context for storm preparedness, risk 
communication, and impact response within the region. 
To do this, I first analyze and tabulate the varying nature of storm lead times across the 
selected Caribbean islands. Next, I offer thought to a scientific research structure relating forecast 
or advisory types and storm lead times to better understand if more intense advisories may be 
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related to longer lead times. Lastly, I offer insight to the possible relationship between storm lead 
times and disaster impacts, before discussing the role of communicating improved climate 
information in the Caribbean. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1. The Varying Nature of Storm Lead Times in the Caribbean 
 
As mentioned, storm lead time is defined as the difference in hours between the time of the 
first-issued advisory by the US National Hurricane Center, and time at approach/landfall, for a 
particular storm for a particular island. Analyzing the data collated for the study’s 14 Caribbean 
countries over the period 1995-2015, there were 486 records of observation: 
 261 records of an issued advisory and resulting approach/landfall (53.7% of total) 
 101 records of “false alarms”, issued advisory but no resulting approach/landfall (20.8%) 
 105 records of “zero-hour lead times”, no issued advisory but approach/landfall (21.6%) 
 19 records of no advisory & no near approach/landfall, but documented impacts (3.9%) 
 
Considering only the 261 records for which there was an advisory and approach/landfall, 
the range of storm lead times was 0.5 – 141 hours, with an average regional lead time of 32.5 
hours. If 105 events with zero-hour lead times were included, i.e. events in which there was no 
issued advisory but there was a storm approach/landfall, as shown in Figure 4-2, there is now a 
lower average lead time of 23.2 hours. It is interesting to note that these region-wide averages for 
the period are similar to the estimate presented in Chapter 2, as shown in Figure 2-1, which 
assimilated data for 24 major storms within the region from 1998-2008.  
A summary table and graph of the zero-hour lead time events are offered in Figure 4-3 and 
Table 4-3, respectively. Most zero-hour lead times relate to tropical storm activity on the islands. 
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False alarm events are here defined as events for which there was an advisory but no subsequent 
approach or landfall by country. Figure 4-4 highlights the declining trend in the number of false 
alarms over time, while Table 4-4 summarizes the false alarm events by the type of advisory. As 
with zero-hour lead time events, it is shown that the majority of the false alarms were related to 
tropical storm conditions, but about 22.5% of these events indicated the possibility for hurricane 
conditions in the respective countries.  
Table 4-5 summarizes the data by country, highlighting a wide range of storm lead times 
by country. To better visualize this, Figure 4-5 shows the variation in lead times across the selected 
Caribbean islands. This map shows that there are eight countries with less than 24 hours average 
lead time (i.e. most of Lesser Antilles, Dominican Republic and Haiti), with Grenada as the only 
country with less than 12 hour average storm advisory lead time. To add context to this 
information, Figure 4-6 shows a map with storm lead times weighted by the number of storms with 
lead times that have affected each island (based on information within this dataset). It is known 
that the most storm-affected country within the region is The Bahamas (49 storms made 
approach/landfall in 1995-2015 period), followed by Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti which 
each experienced more than 37 storms within the period of study. Islands within the southern 
Caribbean generally received the least number of storms – Trinidad and Tobago received 
advisories for or experienced only 8 storms within the period. By doing this, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, and Grenada stand out as the countries most affected by short lead times, followed by 
Bahamas, Dominica, Cuba, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. Table 4-5 also notes that Cuba had 
the most zero-hour lead time events over the period, while Puerto Rico had the most false alarms. 
Table 4-6 cross-references the events by type of storm advisory and record of wind-speed at 
approach/landfall. 
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4.5.2. Connecting Forecast Type and Storm Lead Times 
 
In addition to understanding the varying nature of storm lead times throughout the region, 
another concern of interest is whether different forecast advisory types may be associated with 
shorter or longer storm lead times. As highlighted in Section 4.3.1, NHC advisories in the form of 
‘watches’ indicate the possibility of an event, either tropical storm or hurricane conditions, within 
the specified area within 48 hours, while ‘warnings’ indicate the expectation of an event within 
the specified area within 36 hours. A review of the timeframe that countries may have ahead of 
cyclone impacts may be helpful to further understand the context of preparedness in the Caribbean.  
Table 4-1: Storm Forecast Type and Lead Times 
Dependent Variable:  
Storm Lead Time (hrs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
       
Forecast Type 3.217**      
 (1.556)      
       
Forecast Type:  
TS Watch 
 34.41*** 30.82*** 33.49*** 42.18*** 39.85*** 
 (1.757) (3.594) (5.277) (5.686) (7.521) 
Forecast Type:  
TS Warning 
 16.64*** 13.18*** 13.18** 21.26*** 19.18*** 
 (1.587) (3.381) (5.117) (5.976) (7.327) 
Forecast Type: 
Hurricane Watch 
 44.38*** 38.76*** 42.75*** 47.79*** 44.54*** 
 (2.537) (6.329) (4.865) (5.593) (8.931) 
Forecast Type: 
Hurricane Warning 
 21*** 15.34** 17.47** 23.36** 20.42 
 (4.276) (6.385) (8.253) (11.54) (12.65) 
       
Wind-speed at Impact 
(knots) 
  0.0647   0.0337 
  (0.0553)   (0.0652) 
       
Constant 26.07***      
 (2.996)      
       
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 
R-squared 0.017 0.777 0.778 0.796 0.818 0.818 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No No No No Yes Yes 
 
Table summarizes the linear regression output of storm forecast type on storm lead time (a variable that is calculated 
in hours), for 261 events (considering 14 Caribbean countries over the period 1995-2015). Column 1 indicates the 
specification including the categorical forecast type variable, while Columns 2-6 includes this variable to account 
for the individual levels. Columns 4-6 include a year fixed effect (FE) while Columns 5-6 also include a country 
fixed effect. All columns show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as follows:  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4-1 highlights the summary results of a linear regression of forecast type on storm 
lead time. There are four forecast types, or types of advisories, that are issued by the NHC 
depending on the model likelihood of impact of a storm event on a country: tropical storm watches 
and warnings, and hurricane watches and warnings. Each of these are coded 1 through 4, with 1 
being the lowest advisory type (a tropical storm watch which indicates the possibility of a tropical 
storm conditions) and 4 being the highest (a hurricane warning which indicates the expectation of 
hurricane conditions). The storm lead time, in hours, is calculated based on the first advisory that 
is issued for a particular country for a particular storm, and the Table highlights the nature of lead 
time depending on the type of the first advisory.  
As shown in Column 1, as the advisory gets more severe, there is an increase in storm lead 
time by around 3 hours. Columns 2-6 offer more detail of this relationship based on various 
specifications, some including controls for year, country and the wind-speed at approach/landfall 
in the relevant country. Column 6 indicates that when these controls are included, the occurrence 
of a Tropical Storm Watch is associated with an almost 40-hour increase in the storm lead time, a 
Tropical Storm Warning is associated with just under 20 hours, and a Hurricane Watch is 
associated with just over 44 hours. 
It should be noted that the forecast advisories indicated here represent the first advisory 
issued for a particular storm for a particular country. While in most cases there would have been 
subsequent updating of these advisories to better reflect increased probabilities of storm 
occurrence, this would be the first alert that countries received to activate disaster response and 
management processes. Generally, it seems that countries have a statistically significant longer 
time for advisories concerning watches compared to warnings, and for hurricane conditions 
compared to tropical storm conditions. The comparatively longer timeframe for watches over 
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warnings is generally expected, based on the definition of each and the probabilities associated 
with storm approach and landfall. The comparatively longer timeframe for hurricane-type 
advisories is a good indication that more severe storm conditions seem to have a comparatively 
longer timeframe for reaction. However, a general major element of concern is the still yet 
relatively short timeframes for these advisories – most of these coefficients indicate estimates of 
lead times of less than 48 hours, and many within a 24-hour window. It is of value to discuss 
whether these windows, while notably within the advisory outlook definitions and timeframes, 
may facilitate active preparation in Caribbean countries. As highlighted in Paper 1, such short 
windows of communication may be further hampered by slow communication and dialogue on 
weekends, compared to weekdays. 
4.5.3. Connecting Storm Lead Times, Intensity and Impacts 
 
A follow-up question of concern is whether or not longer lead times may be related to more 
intense storms at approach/landfall, as well as disaster outcomes and impacts. Given the number 
of storm-related disasters within the selected countries, and the impacts that these may have on 
people and the economy, as shown in Table 4-7, it is hoped that having a longer time to prepare 
for impacts may have a negative effect on disaster outcomes. Considering that shorter lead times 
may be associated with limited time to prepare could affect disaster outcomes, and as well intensify 
existing vulnerabilities and weaken resilience measures. The Table shows that physically, 
demographically and economically smaller countries, such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, Antigua & Barbuda, and St. Lucia, tend to be more relatively affected by storm-based 
hazards.  
In general, longer lead times may be positively associated with stronger storms. As the 
graph in Figure 4-1 shows, a local linear regression model shows a positive (and significant) 
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relationship between storm intensity (based on the record of wind-speed at landfall/approach) and 
longer storm lead times. This intuitively makes sense since many storms start out as tropical storms 
and gradually develop into hurricane conditions, taking some time to do so in the process.  
 
Figure 4-1: Plot of Storm Strength vs. Storm Lead Time 
 
 
 
However, as shown in Table 4-2, regression analysis of storm lead time, as well as storm 
intensity, on disaster impacts (here, looking at people affected by storms, as per EM-DAT data) 
shows, unexpectedly, that there is perhaps a positive relationship between these variables. As well, 
as may be expected, more severe advisories seem to be associated with increased impacts. 
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Table 4-2: Connecting Storm Lead Times, Intensity, and Disaster Impacts 
Dependent Variable: 
LogAffected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
       
Storm Leadtime (hrs) 0.0258** 0.00531   -0.00802  
 (0.0101) (0.0101)   (0.0109)  
Windspeed at Impact  0.0191* 0.0201* 0.00696 0.00742  
  (0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0119)  
Forecast Type    0.236 0.239  
    (0.317) (0.319)  
Forecast: TS Watch      8.440*** 
      (1.006) 
Forecast: TS Warning      9.422*** 
      (1.190) 
Forecast: Hurr. Watch      9.038*** 
      (0.802) 
Forecast: Hurr. Warning      10.41*** 
      (1.793) 
Constant 6.134*** 4.897** 5.022** 7.234*** 7.544***  
 (1.151) (2.045) (1.961) (1.558) (1.775)  
       
Observations 112 98 98 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.449 0.471 0.470 0.536 0.540 0.975 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table highlights the results of a linear regression concerning various independent variables on the dependent 
variable, ‘logaffected’, the natural logarithm of the number of persons affected by storm disaster events, over 14 
Caribbean countries, over 1995-2015. Column 1 shows the specification of lead time on ‘logaffected’, Columns 2-5 
focuses on the role of wind-speed at impact (i.e. either approach or landfall) alongside various controls, while 
Column 6 looks at the relationship between the various types of storm advisories on ‘logaffected’. All columns 
include both year and country FE, and show robust standard errors in parentheses, with significance levels as 
follows:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper aims to analyze and understand the general nature of storm lead times within 
the Caribbean, by reviewing data for 14 Caribbean countries/territories over the period 1995-2015. 
Storm lead time, here, is defined as the time interval in hours between the time of the first advisory 
issued for a particular storm for a particular country, and the time of storm approach or landfall. 
Despite the dearth of data and research on the topic, an understanding of storm lead times could 
likely assist Caribbean countries in storm disaster preparedness strategies. 
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The first finding that there is a relatively short regional average lead time of 23.2-32.5 
hours (depending on whether zero-hour lead times are included) dispels the myth that there is a lot 
of time to prepare for a storm. Although it is the intention of forecast advisory watches and 
warnings to be offered 36 to 48 hours in advance, such average short storm forecast lead times 
may hinder the ability of agencies to effectively share information in an efficient and timely 
manner. Further, as described in Chapter 2, since weekends may offer limited communication, 
awareness and capacity amongst the local public as well as government and other disaster-related 
agencies and authorities, this may exacerbate the effects of short lead times.  
As well, the wide-ranging variety of lead times across the selected Caribbean countries 
highlights the fact that one size may not fit all, and each country should be aware of local 
conditions and characteristics to best prepare for impending storm threats. Too often there is the 
fallacy that that there may be sufficient time to mobilize disaster procedures, and the colloquial 
sentiment that “God is a [insert Caribbean nationality]” and the storm may not affect the country 
at all. Considering that there may be more frequent, intense, and rapidly intensifying storms in a 
warming climate, being alert and prepared for storms should be a constant priority for the majority 
of Caribbean islands, especially during the hurricane season.  
In addition, the numbers of zero-hour lead time storms (meaning that there were more 
storms with issued advisories within the region) as well as false alarm events should be of concern. 
Not only does it highlight that some countries are not always aware critical information, but 
challenges of repeated false alarms could be a challenge to encourage continued prepared 
preparedness efforts. 
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In looking at the research structure relating storm forecast types and storm lead times, while 
it is reassuring that more severe types of advisories are associated with a longer lead time, the 
comparatively short lead times to prepare for impending threats is of concern. However, perhaps 
this should be considered in the context of changing trends at the National Hurricane Center 
(NHC). In 2017, just after the scope of this study, there were changes to the way in which 
advisories were issued by the NHC. Noting the need to advise the public about potential threats, 
the NHC started to issue advisories for "potential tropical cyclones", or systems that have yet to 
develop but may pose a threat of bringing tropical-storm-force or hurricane-force winds to land 
areas within 48 hours.35  
While such a change is welcome, and comes with an added degree of caution as well as 
uncertainty, it should be considered alongside improved local disaster preparedness strategies to 
best understand the challenges of each country at both the national and subnational levels. While 
there may be only so much that could be done to minimize damages from a particularly intense 
storm or in times of particularly frequent storm events, knowledge of how storm lead times on 
average differ by country could offer some general directive for resource mobilization and local 
preparedness. Such an analysis into the differences in lead times across the region should be fed 
into local disaster preparedness processes, and the development of localized standard operating 
procedures in times of a disaster. Utilizing storm-related data and climate information in a more 
stringent manner should be encouraged within local and regional planning, as it could provide 
countries with a more appropriate and relevant context for storm preparedness, risk 
communication, and disaster impact. 
                                                                
35 Weather.com (2017). 5 Changes Coming to Hurricane Season Forecasts. Available at: 
https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/changes-coming-this-hurricane-season-2017 
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Lastly, I note that while there is some relationship between stronger storms and longer lead 
times, the association between lead times and disaster impacts is not clear, and may require further 
investigation. As there has not been much research done on this topic, and it could be assumed that 
perhaps having more time in advance of a storm may lead to less impacts, this study doesn’t 
robustly show this. While this could be because longer lead times are also associated with stronger 
storms, which in turn likely have more impacts on countries, perhaps it could also be that it is not 
always about having more time to prepare but perhaps having active preparedness and long term 
resilience to deal with frequent and more severe storms. A better understanding of these 
relationships could be helpful for economic identification. 
 
4.6.1. Communicating Disaster Risk within the Caribbean 
 
Alongside the problem of short lead times of storms for disaster preparedness, and the 
general need for encouraged use of climate information within the region, another area of concern 
is the challenge of communicating disaster risk.  
At the 2016 Wet Season Caribbean Climate Outlook Forum (CariCOF) in Dominica, I was 
able to survey the audience on topics relating to how climate information is communicated within 
the region (Dookie, 2016). This group included region-wide representatives from meteorological 
offices, disaster agencies, as well as specialists from the water, tourism and agricultural sectors. In 
response to a survey question relating to whether or not there were adequate resources within 
weather and disaster agencies on a weekend, compared to the weekday, there was wide agreement 
that there was a ‘weekend effect’ which negatively affected capacity on the weekend. In offering 
thoughts on the related reason for this, selections included challenges on the public side 
(communication to/within local public may be limited on weekends due to cultural, recreational 
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norms), as well as on the agency side (including the selection that some agencies are closed or at 
limited capacity, thereby offering slower response times on a weekend, that certain sectors did not 
maintain 24-hour shift system, and that there was a challenge of mobilizing volunteers on 
weekends). Interestingly, most participants who mentioned that there was a ‘weekend effect’ were 
likely from the English-speaking Caribbean. 
In terms of considering a likely weak link in communicating disaster risk within the region, 
there was a generally even distribution of selection between challenges related to the general public 
and agency capacity. Respondents thought that there was altogether limited general preparation 
for disasters by local public (they think disasters don’t happen often or won't affect them) as well 
as limited awareness of impending threat by local public (not following news, away from info 
sources), and as well there were challenges in agency capacity to both acknowledge and share 
initial information about disaster, as well as to follow-up information and respond to disaster. 
Considering that about 30% of advisories issued do not result in a storm that makes 
approach/landfall, the concern that people think they won’t be affected surely should be followed 
up and agencies would need to find creative ways to address storm preparedness and awareness 
despite high levels of false alarms. 
In asking about the most essential resource needed to address these weak links, most 
responded that improved institutional support was needed to utilize available climate information, 
and as well, there needed to be improved communication, through better strategizing and local 
coordination. 
Understanding the time lags between storm advent and impact could offer insights for early 
warning systems, disaster preparedness, disaster risk management and resilience strategies. A short 
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21.8-33.4 hour lead time, the variety of lead times within the region, and ‘weekend effect’ signals 
the need for increased efforts for timely and appropriate risk communication, and the need to better 
incorporate weather/climate information into disaster preparedness strategies. While this has been 
of concern within the region (see Dookie, Enenkel & Spence, 2019), the movement to improve the 
capacity of local meteorological offices and hydro-met service delivery, as well as the 
identification and incorporation of climate information in disaster and climate resilient strategies 
has been slow. This could be due to a limited awareness of the plausibility and benefits of doing 
so, or governance challenges, or both. Either way, such efforts would complement ongoing 
scientific research efforts to better understand the track and intensity of storms, although further 
discussion is needed when considering the impact of rapid intensifying storms and how this might 
affect preparedness within the region.  
It would be important to share the details of such findings with regional and local partners 
and sectors. A visualization of the variety of lead times, as well as a general discussion on the 
potential of using and how to use weather/climate information could be a helpful input for local 
meteorological offices and disaster agencies as they take steps towards improving the 
communication of risk and building disaster resilience in region. As well, since the Caribbean 
Climate Outlook Forums have been critical in bringing together local meteorological offices and 
disaster agencies to work with and learn from research institute collaborations such as the 
Caribbean Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology and the International Research Center for 
Climate and Society, this could be an avenue to share this information.  
One of the critical ideas mentioned within the CariCOF survey responses was the need for 
institutional support to utilize available climate information, and so perhaps there could be some 
consideration within CariCOF on improved training options, as well as consideration of how to 
 
 
126 
reach wider audiences and how best to communicate risk and connect climate information with 
societal response. Another suggestion could be the collaboration with NASA’s Applied Remote 
Sensing Training (ARSET) program, which provides in-person and online trainings focusing on 
the access and applications of remote sensing observations for disaster management (see 
https://arset.gsfc.nasa.gov/disasters). I have found their webinars quite useful, for example 
‘Remote Sensing for Disasters Scenarios’ which focuses on the applications of remote sensing for 
tropical storms, floods, earthquakes and landslides, and would advocate for a course specifically 
tailored for the Caribbean region. Lastly, increased liaisons within the US National Hurricane 
Center as well as between the NHC and local counterparts could also enhance how this information 
is disseminated and used efficiently within the region. Empowering local agencies with relevant 
and appropriate local climate information and knowledge could be an important step towards 
minimizing disaster and climate risk and improving resilience within the Caribbean. 
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4.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 4-2: Summary of Storm Lead Times for 14 Caribbean countries, 1995-2015 
 
 
Chart highlights storm lead times of 366 storm events across 14 Caribbean countries over the period 1995-2015. The 
storm lead time is defined as the time difference in hours between the first storm advisory issued and 
approach/landfall for a particular storm for a particular country, in hours. These 366 storm events include 261 events 
for which there was an issued advisory and resulting approach/landfall for one of the selected 14 Caribbean 
countries within the period, as well as 105 zero-hour lead time events. The average lead time for the 366 events is 
23.2 hours. The colors in this graph are visual aids and do not correspond to particular identifying information. 
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Figure 4-3: Number of Zero-Hour Lead Time Storm Events, by year, 1995-2015 
 
 
Graph shows a plot showing the number of storm events with zero-hour lead times across 14 Caribbean countries, 
over 1995-2015. Storm lead time is defined as the time difference in hours between the first storm advisory issued 
and the approach/landfall for a particular storm for a particular country, in hours, and zero-hour lead times refer to 
storms which had an approach/landfall, but no advisory. A trend line is included.  
 
 
 
Table 4-3: Summary of Zero-Hour Lead Time Storm Events, by Impact Type 
Type of Impact Range of Wind-speed Number of Events 
Tropical Depression (TD) 0 – 33 knots 71 
Tropical Storm (TS) 34 – 64 knots 25 
Hurricane Cat 1 (H1) 65 – 83 knots 2 
Hurricane Cat 2 (H2) 84 – 95 knots 3 
Hurricane Cat 3 (H3) 96 – 113 knots 2 
Hurricane Cat 4 (H4) 113 – 136 knots 0 
Hurricane Cat 5 (H5) 137 + knots 0 
Extra-tropical Storm (ET)  2 
 
 105 
 
Table summarizes the zero-hour lead time storm events by the type of event at approach/landfall, across 14 
Caribbean countries, over 1995-2015. Storm lead time is defined as the time difference in hours between the first 
storm advisory issued and approach/landfall for a particular storm for a particular country, in hours, and zero-hour 
lead times refer to storms which had an approach/landfall, but no advisory.  
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Figure 4-4: Number of False-Alarm Storm Events, by year, 1995-2015 
 
 
Graph shows a plot showing the number of storm events with false-alarms across 14 Caribbean countries, over 
1995-2015. Storm lead time is defined as the time difference in hours between the first storm advisory issued and 
approach/landfall for a particular storm for a particular country, in hours, and false-alarm events refer to storms with 
an advisory but no approach/landfall. A trend line is included.  
 
 
Table 4-4: Summary of False-Alarm Storm Events, by Advisory Type 
Type of Impact Summary of Advisory Number of Events 
Tropical Storm Watch Conditions possible within 48 hours 64 
Tropical Storm Warning Conditions expected within 36 hours 14 
Hurricane Watch Conditions possible within 48 hours 23 
Hurricane Warning Conditions expected within 36 hours 0 
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Table summarizes the false-alarm storm events by the type of event in the forecast advisory, across 14 Caribbean 
countries, over 1995-2015. Storm lead time is defined as the time difference in hours between the first storm 
advisory issued and approach/landfall for a particular storm for a particular country, in hours, and false-alarm events 
refer to storms with an advisory but no approach/landfall.  
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Table 4-5: Storm Lead Times, by Country, 1995-2015 
Country 
Mean Lead 
Time 
# Storms with 
Lead Time 
Weighted 
Lead Time 
Max Lead 
Time 
# False 
Alarms 
# Zero 
Leads 
Antigua & Barbuda 26.6 28 0.95 87 8 7 
Bahamas 32.9 49 0.67 108 10 9 
Barbados 13.3 17 0.78 33 4 4 
Cuba 29.0 43 0.67 141 6 13 
Dominica 15.5 22 0.71 51 11 8 
Dominican Republic 18.8 37 0.51 57 7 12 
Grenada 9.6 19 0.51 42 4 10 
Haiti 22.1 38 0.58 66 2 9 
Jamaica 29.8 19 1.57 63 12 5 
Puerto Rico 29.7 23 1.29 63 13 6 
St. Kitts & Nevis 26.4 24 1.10 75 8 6 
St. Lucia 16.1 18 0.89 39 7 6 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 15.2 21 0.73 39 4 7 
Trinidad & Tobago 12.0 8 1.50 33 5 3 
Regional 23.2 366  141 101 105 
 
Table summarizes storm lead time data for 14 Caribbean countries over 1995-2015. Storm lead time is defined as 
the time difference in hours between the first storm advisory issued and the impact for a particular storm for a 
particular country, in hours. “Weighted lead time” is the weighting of the mean lead time by the number of storms 
with lead times, per country.  False alarms or false-warning events refer to storms with an advisory but no impact, 
and zero-hour lead times refer to storms which had an impact, but no advisory.  
 
 
Table 4-6: Summary of Number of Advisories by Record of Storm Wind-speed 
 Trop. Storm 
Watch 
Trop. Storm 
Warning 
Hurricane 
Watch 
Hurricane 
Warning 
No Advisory 
Issued 
 
TD 12 11 2 0 71 96 
TS 64 46 15 0 25 150 
H1 20 8 18 0 2 48 
H2 6 3 8 2 3 22 
H3 5 2 12 0 2 21 
H4 4 3 18 0 0 25 
H5 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ET 0 1 0 0 2 3 
No Record 64 14 23 0 19 120 
 111 74 74 2 124 486 
 
Table summarizes the number of storm advisories by the recorded storm wind-speeds at approach/landfall. Total 
number of storm events is 486; 105 refer to “zero-hour lead times” (i.e. no advisory but recorded wind-speed), 101 
to “false alarm” events (i.e. events with an advisory but no record of approach or landfall), and 19 events of no 
recorded advisory or approach/landfall, but some indication that there was an impact in the country.  
 
 
131 
Table 4-7: Storm-related Disaster Data for the Caribbean, 1995-2015 
 
 
Table summarizes storm-related disaster data for 14 Caribbean countries over 1995-2015, as sourced from EM-DAT 
(2019).  
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Figure 4-5: Map of Caribbean islands, based on Average Storm Approach Lead Time 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Map of Caribbean islands, based on Storm Lead Time weighted by number of storms 
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Table 4-8: Storm Categorization 
Category Sustained Winds Types of Damage (for Hurricane-Force Winds) 
Tropical 
Depression 
(TD) 
<33 knots  
<38 mph 
<61 km/h 
 
Tropical 
Storm  
(TS) 
34–63 knots  
39–73 mph 
63–118 km/h 
 
1 
(H1) 
64-82 knots  
74-95 mph 
119-153 km/h 
Very dangerous winds will produce some damage: Well-constructed frame 
homes could have damage to roof, shingles, vinyl siding and gutters. Large 
branches of trees will snap and shallowly rooted trees may be toppled. Extensive 
damage to power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that could last 
a few to several days. 
2 
(H2) 
83-95 knots 
96-110 mph 
154-177 km/h 
Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage: Well-constructed 
frame homes could sustain major roof and siding damage. Many shallowly rooted 
trees will be snapped or uprooted and block numerous roads. Near-total power 
loss is expected with outages that could last from several days to weeks. 
3 
(H3) 
(major) 
96-112 knots 
111-129 mph 
178-208 km/h 
Devastating damage will occur: Well-built framed homes may incur major 
damage or removal of roof decking and gable ends. Many trees will be snapped or 
uprooted, blocking numerous roads. Electricity and water will be unavailable for 
several days to weeks after the storm passes. 
4 
(H4) 
(major) 
113-136 knots  
130-156 mph 
209-251 km/h 
Catastrophic damage will occur: Well-built framed homes can sustain severe 
damage with loss of most of the roof structure and/or some exterior walls. Most 
trees will be snapped or uprooted and power poles downed. Fallen trees and 
power poles will isolate residential areas. Power outages will last weeks to 
possibly months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months. 
5 
(H5) 
(major) 
>137 knots 
>157 mph  
>252 km/h 
Catastrophic damage will occur: A high percentage of framed homes will be 
destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen trees and power poles 
will isolate residential areas. Power outages will last for weeks to possibly 
months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months. 
Source: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php    
Note: The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is a 1 to 5 rating based on a hurricane's sustained wind speed. This 
scale estimates potential property damage. Hurricanes reaching Category 3 and higher are considered major 
hurricanes because of their potential for significant loss of life and damage. Category 1 and 2 storms are still 
dangerous, however, and require preventative measures.  
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